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CONTENTS

ENERGY ECONOMICS

ARGENTINA

Briefs

1980 Energy Statistics 1

BOLIVIA

Briefs

Energy Reserves Insufficient 2

GUATEMALA

Briefs

Gasoline Substitute Invented 3
Fuel, Fertilizer Invention 3

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Labor Troubles Escalate at Electricity Plants
(TRINIDAD GUARDIAN, 6 Jan 81)..... 4

COUNTRY SECTION

ARGENTINA

Influence of Social Democrats on Peronism Analyzed
(Carlos Fernandez; CONVICCION, 4 Jan 81)..... 6Paper Discusses Circumstances Affecting Regional Pacts
(CLARIN, 29 Dec 80)..... 8Isabel Peron's Release Generates Mixed Reaction
(Tabare Areas; SEMOS, 2 Jan 81)..... 10

'CLARIN' on Lesson of Hostage Incident (Editorial; CLARIN, 23 Jan 81).....	12
Briefs	
Peso Devalued 10 Percent	14
BRAZIL	
Newspaper Considers Agreement on Hostages Humiliating (Editorial; JORNAL DO BRASIL, 24 Jan 81).....	15
Meaning of Free Interest Rates Examined (O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 22 Jan 81).....	17
COLOMBIA	
Text of New Law on Visas Published (EL TIEMPO, 7-10 Jan 81).....	19
ECUADOR	
Leader of Democratic Left Outlines Party Objectives (EL COMERCIO, 11 Jan 81).....	41
Political Developments of Past Year Analyzed (Cristobal Zambrano; EL COMERCIO, 1 Jan 81).....	43
Political, Economic, International Issues Surveyed (Victor Hinostroza; EL COMERCIO, 11 Jan 81).....	46
Economic Difficulties Predicted for 1981 (Manuel Maldonado Posso; EL COMERCIO, 31 Dec 80).....	48
EL SALVADOR	
FMLN's Villalobos Discusses Military Activities in Morazan (Joaquin Villalobos Interview; BARRICADA, 5 Jan 81).....	50
FDR's Pichinte Urges People's Unity for Final Offensive (Leoncio Pichinte Interview; BARRICADA, 5 Jan 81).....	54
Archbishopric Legal Aid Service Condemns Junta's New Structure (BARRICADA, 26 Dec 80).....	56
GUYANA	
Briefs	
Pact With Canada	61

MEXICO

Ambassador to Haiti Named (EL DIA, 16 Jan 81).....	62
---	----

NICARAGUA

All Citizens Urged to Uphold 1981 Theme of Defense Production (Editorial; BARRICADA, 4 Jan 81).....	63
CSN Discusses Importance of Achieving Working Class Unity (BARRICADA, 5 Jan 81).....	65

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Opposition Leader Panday Returned, Outlines ULF Policy (TRINIDAD GUARDIAN, 5 Jan 81).....	70
Editorial Scores Bishop's 'Tawdry Scenario' in Grenada (TRINIDAD GUARDIAN, 8 Jan 81).....	72
Widespread Labor Unrest, Strikes Mark Past Year (TRINIDAD GUARDIAN, 1 Jan 81).....	74
Labor Strife at Port Continues; Vessels Diverted (TRINIDAD GUARDIAN, 31 Dec 80).....	75

BRIEFS

1980 ENERGY STATISTICS--Buenos Aires, 29 Jan (NA)--According to the Energy Secretariat, petroleum production during 1980 increased by 4 percent compared to production during 1979, while imports of hydrocarbons increased by 26 percent during the same period of time. The same source added that the pumping of natural gas increased by 7.5 percent, and electricity production increased by 8 percent. According to the report, the total Argentine petroleum production during 1980 amounted to 28.58 million cubic meters, with a record production in the month of December of an average of 80,200 cubic meters per day, which represented a net increase of 4.2 percent compared to 1979. At the same time, the volume of imported crude totaled 2.53 million cubic meters, an increase of 26.1 percent, although the international price increase led to a 52.3-percent cost increase with a total of \$538.5 million. Overall Argentine fuel imports totaled \$1,063,500,000, a reduction of 5.2 percent, while exports totaled \$266 million, a 421-percent increase compared to 1979. The volume of natural gas pumped through pipelines reached 9,871,500,000 cubic meters, a 7.5-percent increase, while the mining of marketable coal diminished by 46.4 percent. The latest report says that the generation of electricity totaled 35.78 million megawatts per hour, an 8.1-percent increase. The participation of sources of hydroelectric generation increased from 32 to 42.2 percent of the total, while that of thermal sources diminished from 59.8 to 51.2 percent and the participation of nuclear sources (Atucha) was reduced from 8.2 to 6.6 percent. [Text] [PY302334 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1203 GMT 29 Jan 81]

CSO: 3010

BRIEFS

ENERGY RESERVES INSUFFICIENT—During the decade 1970-79, Bolivian homes used more electricity than the industries of the nation. This is an expression of the low degree of development reached by this country, according to the report on energy consumption drawn up by the Energy and Hydrocarbons Ministry. The document says in its concluding chapter that national industry is still in its initial stages. There are no great consumers, such as the electrometallurgy or electrochemical industries. The report stresses that the fact that home consumption of energy surpasses industrial consumption leads to great variations in demand during the day, with a disproportionate consumption during peak hours, a situation which is aggravated by the fact that no interconnection system among the electrical network has yet begun to function during the last decade. According to the report, national energy reserves are insufficient to meet internal demand during the remaining years of this century. Those reserves must therefore be increased and their development improved. [Text] [PY261616 La Paz Rado Illimani Network in Spanish 1130 GMT 26 Jan 81]

CSO: 3010

BRIEFS

GASOLINE SUBSTITUTE INVENTED--A fuel made of plants that was recently discovered in Guatemala has been acknowledged by North American and Israeli scientists as the major world alternative to replace gasoline in running automotive vehicles. This new product, discovered by a Guatemalan, Roberto Estrada, has many more effective properties than the combination of sugarcane alcohol and gasoline that up to now was considered the best alternative for reducing the high cost of running motors in which combustion is generated by petroleum derivatives. The fuel, called Alcomaya, is obtained from corn, sunflowers and other vegetable ingredients that can be grown in Guatemala on a large scale and at low cost. A basic quality of Alcomaya is that it is 100 percent vegetable, contrary to the so-called gasohol, which is 20 percent alcohols and 80 percent gasoline. [Excerpt] [Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 15 Nov 80 p 23] 9545

FUEL, FERTILIZER INVENTION--International experts and representatives of various government and private institutions in Guatemala consider the biofertilizer and biogas system invented by Guatemalan engineer Mario David Penagos Gozalbo decisive for national economic development. This invention has already been patented in industrialized countries and in several developing nations. Biogas will save a tremendous amount of foreign currency, since using waste materials produces energy capable of running industrial plants and vehicles, as well as fueling stoves and other domestic apparatus. Biogas will avoid the increasingly huge consumption of wood, which is one of the main forms of deforestation in Guatemala. Biofertilizer changes arid soil into fertile fields. [Excerpt] [Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 15 Dec 80 p 4] 9545

CSO: 3010

LABOR TROUBLES ESCALATE AT ELECTRICITY PLANTS

Port-of-Spain TRINIDAD GUARDIAN in English 6 Jan 81 p 1

[Text] The Trinidad and Tobago Electricity Commission has embarked on load shedding as a labour row grips its Point Lisas and Penal generating plants.

At the weekend, large areas in Central and Northern Trinidad were without lights for more than an hour when the national power company began shedding load as problems developed on the operating shifts at the two southern plants.

On Saturday, Barataria, San Juan, Aranguez, Mt. Lambert were without power for more than an hour starting at 8 p.m. and the situation was repeated on Sunday night, this time from 10 p.m.

Yesterday, however, the labour row escalated at the two generating plants when the company locked out its operators.

The workers in TTEC are represented by the Oilfields Workers Trade Union and its president, George Weekes, said yesterday the workers at the Penal and Point Lisas plants want the company to streamline working hours in keeping with Port-of-Spain.

Mr. Weekes said the operators were working more than the normal 40 hours weekly.

A statement from the OWTU said that the operators at the two plants were locked out yesterday and a meeting is to be held today with TTEC at the Ministry of Labour.

Shorter Week

Last night, Mr. Roy Mitchell, Public Relations Officer of TTEC, said that the company was aware the operators were contemplating to reduce their 40-hour work week and had been advised against the move because it would contravene a decision made by the Industrial Court in 1979.

He said the operators at Penal and Point Lisas power stations ignored the advice and embarked on industrial action to press their claim for reduction of the working hours.

"The Commission has been meeting and will continue to meet with the OWTU in an effort to resolve the matter," he said.

"Senior managerial personnel have been doing all in their power to operate the units themselves since Friday. This puts considerable strain on our resources and it would undoubtedly be difficult to continue operating in this manner indefinitely" he said.

Mr. Mitchell said if the situation should deteriorate conditions would arise whereby there would not be enough generating plant in operation to meet the system's demand and under such circumstances the Commission would shed load.

CSO: 3025

INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATS ON PERONISM ANALYZED

Buenos Aires CONVICCION in Spanish 4 Jan 81 p 13

[Article by Carlos Fernandez]

[Excerpts] Social Democracy and Justicialism

There are also many Justicialist leaders who are concerned about what they consider to be a new attempt by the Social Democratic International to bring Justicialism under its wing.

According to them, this new tactic would achieve the supremacy of that organization among the ranks of Justicialism, with the support of a sector that advocates the revamping of the party's economic doctrine. Some Peronist leaders insist that the recent congress held on this issue at the Hotel Savoy is one manifestation of that attitude.

There is absolute agreement among Justicialist leaders that internal power should be divided equally among the fundamental elements of that political movement, without the predominance of any of them.

These same people point out that at the pinnacle of power in the Social Democratic International there is a disagreement between current Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his former colleague, Willy Brandt. According to them, Schmidt favors strengthening Europe and its sphere of influence against the Soviet advance, while Brandt insists on "Ostpolitik," or detente with the East.

Of these two factions, the one with more influence on Justicialist labor leaders is Brandt's. The connection is Felipe Gonzalez, secretary of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party. More precisely, in some Justicialist circles it is said that the link is formed by the work of two Argentine attorneys (from the interior) who are acting as advisers to Gonzalez in Spain. Recently they traveled to Argentina to talk with a group of labor leaders, including Lorenzo Miguel, it is reported.

The Justicialist political leaders oppose any attempt to form an international alliance at this time, and they plan to postpone any decision on this matter until the world political picture becomes clearer. Therefore, they trust that the labor leaders will limit their actions to their internal sphere of influence, and will not try to modify a structure that is able to maintain a delicate balance, but still a balance, as they point out.

This assertion becomes apparent as the members of that group continue to speculate that the legal status of the former president will be defined in March. This event will add one more factor to the Justicialist equation, supposedly the resolution of conflicts such as the one discussed here. At least that is what the Peronist leaders hope.

8926

CSO: 3010

PAPER DISCUSSES CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING REGIONAL PACTS

Buenos Aires CLARIN in Spanish 29 Dec 80 p 10

[Text] Bolivia's recent "abstention" concerning its ties with the Andean Pact once more emphasizes the conflict between regional integration programs and the individual interests of the countries that belong to them. This is especially true when Bolivia's position on the Cartagena Agreement is considered in conjunction with Chile's withdrawal 2 years ago, and with the fact that it is appearing in the context of the stagnation of the basic projects that gave rise to the pact. All this translates into the remarkable weakness of the regionalist pact.

More than 20 years ago the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) came into being as a result of member countries' trade needs. It was considered the first step toward regional integration, and the bridgehead of a subcontinental common market. The proponents of such methods stressed the alleged need to complement the different national economies as a basis for regional development. However, as time went by, it became apparent that any steps taken to erase borderlines, beyond the mere expansion of trade, favored above all the production and distribution schedules of the large transnational corporations, in accordance with their own criteria for efficiency and profits.

The divergence of those interests with those of the participating countries soon put a stop to integrationist proposals, and LAFTA entered a long period of decline, lasting practically the entire second decade of its existence.

This year, as a result of the failure of these proposals, LAFTA became the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) after prolonged negotiations. The hallmark of this changeover was the abandonment of the multilateral concept in favor of the institution of norms designed to stimulate bilateral agreements as a way of achieving broader regional integration. Within this framework we find the free trade zone established between Argentina and Uruguay, and a similar one between Uruguay and Brazil that is being negotiated. Before, however, in view of the disparities among the LAFTA member economies, regional agreements were drawn up to include more homogeneous countries. Thus, the Cartagena Agreement created the Andean Pact, whose original members were Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.

This setup did not achieve the desired results, and in 1978 Chile pulled out because of a disagreement regarding the treatment of foreign capital. During the

following 2 years, the Cartagena Agreement, regardless of the political bias it adopted, remained practically paralyzed in terms of its specific goals. The approval of the sectorial development program for the automobile industry remained a mere formality because there was no negotiation with the international companies; the industrial plans agreed upon before Chile's withdrawal were brought to a halt.

This stagnation was clearly manifested at the beginning of this month when the ministers of development and industry of the Andean Pact were unable to arrive at common external tariffs due to the diversity of the various countries' requirements.

Bolivia's adoption of an abstentionist policy did not respond to that economic issue, however, but to political alliances. Nonetheless, it emphasizes the conflict between the country's self-determination and its membership in the Pact. It also exposes the weakness of the ties created among the members of the pact, since nothing really changed as a result of the abstention.

These circumstances are living proof of the discordance between national proposals and regionalist objectives. This fact should not be used to back up any isolationist purposes, but serves to confirm that there is no better platform for the fruitful interrelation of the brother nations of America than the autonomous growth of each of them.

8926

C80: 3010

ISABEL PERON'S RELEASE GENERATES MIXED REACTION

Buenos Aires SOMOS in Spanish 2 Jan 81 pp 4-5

[Article by Tabare Areas]

[Text] Judging by outward appearances, everything is still the same at San Vicente. The estate known as "17 de Octubre" is guarded by policemen and the neighbor say there have been no new movements inside or outside the house. This tranquility contrasts with the state of mobilization that has been observed in the ranks of Peronism in anticipation of Maria Estela Martinez de Peron's change in status (at present she is under the exclusive control of the Ministry of Justice). There have been many comments in particularly sensitive military circles every time the issue has come up.

Although well-informed sources will not venture to guess the date when Isabel Peron will be released (the internment imposed by the Military Junta under the Institutional Responsibility Act has ended, but the trials in progress still require preventive detention), some observers claim it could happen between February and March. For these observers, however, there are still two fundamental questions to be answered: How much latitude will she be given (will the ban on political activity still be in effect?), and where will she live?

At a reception given for journalists at the end of the year by members of the Justicialist movement, Eloy Camus and Deolindo Felipe Bittel both agreed--off the record--that according to the information they had, Isabel would not be willing to live abroad indefinitely, even if that were the only way she could be released. Meanwhile, in another end-of-the-year toast, former Peronist Deputy Luis Sobrino Aranda revealed that during his trip to Panama Gen Omar Torrijos had shown him a residence that had been made ready to house the former president. Torrijos has offered her his hospitality on many occasions. Another alternative that is being mentioned in party circles is that Isabel will take a brief rest in Panama and Spain, with the promise of returning to Argentina within a short period.

In this context, however, it is essential that we determine Isabel Peron's precise legal status. She is the defendant in four trials: Two deal with the Solidarity Crusade--including the check for 3 billion old pesos--and are taking place in Judge Norberto Giletta's court; another relates to the return of the property owned by the Justicialist Party at 711 Moreno Street. The fourth trial deals with the management of reserve funds belonging to the presidency, and it is being heard

by Judge Martin Anzoategui. In legal circles there is a consensus that the latter proceeding, in which there has been no indictment, has become the key to the legal solution of Isabel Peron's situation. If Anzoategui dismisses the case, the defendant will automatically be given "first liberty." As of that moment, they claim, there will be a rapid chain of events resulting in the definitive freedom of the former president. Several jurists who are very familiar with the case stated that if Judge Anzoategui dismisses the case (an event that is almost certain to take place), the trial being held in the Narvaiz court will automatically fall through, and the prescription will become effective. At the same time, these sources claim, Defender Julio Isaac Arriola would drop his motion to have evidence produced in the two Giletti trials, a step that would cut through a lot of legal red tape and leave the judge free to pronounce sentence. The sentence would have to be handed down within 40 days, meaning the first days of March. At the same time, sources completely reject the possibility of a pardon before any judicial decision. Why? Because pardons apply only to effective sentences, not to future or possible convictions.

Although there is probably no sector of Peronism that wants Isabel Peron to remain in custody, many leaders are concerned about the consequences of her release in terms of the internal workings of Justicialism. They fear that the "ultraverticalists" really want her to become party chief, leading to a resurgence of "dedocracia" [democracy by designation] and therefore aggravating the internal conflicts of Peronism.

What political supports will the former president choose when she is released? This issue has caused more than one bitter argument among Peronists, but not close enough to home to prevent a very clear-cut situation. The Iron Guard (an organization now formally dissolved, led by Alejandro Alvarez, that was imitated by the Verticalist Group) is the group that most ardently proclaims that Isabel is the chief, that the entire movement should obey her, and that it is ready to lend her logistic and political support. The "female branch" (virtually divided into two groups headed by Rosaura Isla and Susana Rozich) agrees that Isabel Peron should be obeyed completely, although the women who belong to the Eva Peron Group, led by Nilda Garre and Alicia Oliveira, exalt the figure of Juan Peron's second [as published] wife to set themselves apart from Isabelism.

But the most celebrated figures considered to be natural proponents of Isabel, in terms of their importance, are members of the ultraverticalist faction: Lazaro Roca, Bernardo Montenegro, Nestor Carrasco, Rosaura Isla and Juan Labake. On the other hand, Deolindo Felipe Bittel of Chaco cannot be considered an uncompromising verticalist, but he has no choice but to move in that direction since Isabel Peron is the president of the structure of which he is vice-president. Another key man is Lorenzo Miguel, who reportedly continues to maintain quite broad contact with the former president.

On the other side of the coin, the strongest opposition to Isabel Peron can be found in the Doctrinal Reaffirmation Movement of Raul Matera and Osella Munoz. There is also a core of notables who do not belong to the inner circles and who, while not exactly against Isabel, deny her political abilities not only to lead the nation, but also simply to take political action with a minimum level of efficiency. Among them are Angel Federico Robledo, Italo Luder, Jorge Paladino and Miguel Unamuno, despite the conceptual or tactical differences that divide them. March (the Viola issue notwithstanding) is awaited anxiously by Peronists.

'CLARIN' ON LESSON OF HOSTAGE INCIDENT

PY272014 Buenos Aires CLARIN in Spanish 23 Jan 81 p 8

[Editorial: "The Lesson of the Hostages"]

[Text] The release of the hostages taken at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979 by Muslim students has aroused mixed feelings in the United States. The first reaction was obviously one of happiness caused by the imminent return to their homes of those who were faced with an uncertain future. After that, the prevailing feeling was one of indignation which was even voiced by the highest-ranking state authorities.

It has often been stated that legality is the shield the weak use against the strong. This also happens, particularly, at the international level. Organized society has been paving its way toward a coexistence which claims to be one of harmony with legal tools freely agreed on which aid justice to prevail. Of course acts of force are still performed, but this is not the rule quite the contrary, since the censure stemming from these acts of force tend to become more overwhelming every day.

The Iranian revolution has a long list of offenses against the United States. It could not be otherwise due to the close relationship which all the Washington governments maintained with the imperial regime, the establishment of which they contributed to when they managed to oust the nationalist government of Mossadegh. However--and going beyond the judgment that background data merits--the truth is that Khomeyni's Muslim government chose its own isolation when it approved the action carried out by the students (headed by the ayatollah's own son) against the diplomats who were taken as hostages.

In choosing illegality the Iranian revolution was betraying its own stated intentions. It would no longer be the path for the restitution of the people's violated rights but a path of scornfully returning to a medieval conception of the world. For the prisoners every day and every minute were undoubtedly torturous. For the jailers that same span of time was measured in an active and cumulative discredit.

Those responsible for dealing with the state affairs, beyond Khomeyni's all-embracing instructions, were perfectly aware of this and it occupied a great deal of the domestic discussions in the Persian country during the past year. Many personalities had to give way to more fanatic colleagues, others resigned

themselves to holding power in name but not in fact, or sought an impossible solution to save the future of a country plunged into uncertainty in other fields.

The war with Iraq, which was started by Baghdad, was encouraged by the weakening of a regime which had purged the army, lacked the spare parts for its (highly sophisticated) military equipment and spent its time on sterile disputes while its production decreased. This situation was worsened by the conflict. In honor of the long-suffering Iranian people it must be stated that they have endured the conflict in unfavorable conditions but with stoicism. The challenge united them, but at this point the Iraqis have blown up the installations for their basic wealth, petroleum. However, the regime of the ayatollahs dragged out the negotiation until the last day of Carter's government subjecting it to a series of difficult conditions, many of which were financial conditions (the unfreezing of assets blocked on Carter's orders as a reprisal).

The release of the hostages was welcomed by the entire world as a victory of international legality over the irrational forces which intend to harm it without taking the consequences or risks into account. The feelings in the United States will adjust--so it is hoped--once a cold analysis of the reality, with all the elements which compose it, is started.

The result--in sum--has been a hard lesson for Iran, a country that forgot that the law protects the weak.

CSO: 3010

BRIEFS

PESO DEVALUED 10 PERCENT--(NA)--The Argentine peso will be devalued against the dollar as from today by 10 percent, according to a statement released by the government last night. The immediate devaluation is part of progressive changes in the exchange rate forecast for the period up to August 31 and approved by President Jorge Videla and president-designate Roberto Viola, who met yesterday to discuss a number of pressing national issues. The devaluation measure was adopted after prolonged deliberations and negotiations between the current economic team and Lorenzo Sigaut acting as the "economic representative" of the incoming Viola administration. The move threw a shockwave through financial circles, since the rumours of a possible considerable devaluation which were making the rounds last year had recently lost force and had been somewhat disregarded by the banking community. The announcement of a 10 percent decline in the peso came, then, as an almost total surprise when it was leaked and later confirmed yesterday. The statement, put out by the Public Information Secretariat instead of, as would be usual, by the Central Bank, also indicated that the 10 percent decline would be followed up by monthly devaluations of 3 percent in the dollar-peso sale parity and 2 percent in the dollar-peso purchase parity. [Text] [PY031642 Buenos Aires HERALD in English 3 Feb 81 p 1]

CSO: 3020

NEWSPAPER CONSIDERS AGREEMENT ON HOSTAGES HUMILIATING

PY280133 Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 24 Jan 81 p 10

[Editorial: "A Hazy Agreement"]

[Text] In addition to a mutual resentment that will take time to die, relations between the United States and Iran, now that the hostages have been freed, are currently limited to a strange agreement that is the crowning point of the inconsistencies of Jimmy Carter's diplomacy.

Agreements between nations are not subject to any type of higher forum to guarantee their implementation. In various circumstances treaties have been torn up in the name of the national interest. Due to the fact that the Iranian-U.S. agreement was obtained through blackmail, the obligation to honor it tends to be diminished.

Only this fact can perhaps explain some of its clauses. Once the hostages had been freed, why should the United States help the Tehran government to recover the shah's fortune, most of which is deposited in Europe in secret accounts and under false names? In the name of what principle is that type of information requested to be sent by private and government sources within 30 days to the U.S. Treasury Department so that it can immediately be conveyed to Tehran?

Excluding blackmail, how can it be understood that the United States has agreed to freeze all the assets in its territory that are a part of the shah's inheritance or those assets that belong to his close relatives?

No explanation can be given for the agreement's clause whereby the U.S. Government will serve notice to all U.S. courts that Iranian suits to recover the shah's fortune cannot be considered illegal and that all Iranian decrees about the shah not conflicting with U.S. laws should be complied with. Would there have been, in fact, a preoccupation with putting the agreement in accord with U.S. laws? Regarding the clause just mentioned, what happened to the principle of separation of government branches?

Apart from the fundamental fact that it is a blackmail, that strange agreement takes us retrospectively to the 1980 U.S. elections. The case of the hostages permanently cast its shadow over the U.S. presidential campaign--favoring initially Jimmy Carter, who imbued with the serious responsibility of his post,

managed to upstage his powerful competitor for the Democratic Party's nomination. Edward Kennedy was one of the victims by failing to make a convincing case against the incumbent president.

As time wore on, however, the delay in obtaining the liberation of the captives became a liability for the president himself, a liability which loomed larger following the thwarted rescue operation attempted in April—a setback which may have imperceptibly decided the outcome of the electoral campaign.

The accumulated frustrations caused the president to become obsessed with Iran. Among other things, this obsession prevented the president from properly dealing with a much more serious crisis that simultaneously was gaining momentum in Afghanistan and, as the November deadline drew nearer, it may have grown even larger. In addition to the permanent blackmail, that state of mind may help to explain why such a great power as the United States decided to sign an agreement in a gesture that is tantamount to signing a receipt for its humiliation.

CSO: 3001

MEANING OF FREE INTEREST RATES EXAMINED

PY290002 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 22 Jan 81 p 3

[Article from the "Notes and Information" page: "Freedom for Interest Rates"]

[Text] In November when the National Monetary Council [CMN] eliminated the 10 percent reduction factor on interest rates, thus unfreezing rates for financial institutions, we predicted that within a few months this practice would extend throughout the sector, and this was decided during yesterday's meeting of the CMN. Such an unfreezing may scare commerce and industry. Meanwhile, it is necessary not to give very much importance to this measure, which will not alter the current situation of the market very much. From this perspective, what is important and regrettable is the fact that the finance minister let it be known, during the meeting of the CMN yesterday, that inflation during 1981 could be higher than last year's...[ellipsis as published]

Although interest rates have been controlled to date, it is necessary to acknowledge that in practice the cost of money has increased. In effect, within a regulated credit system and with a forecast that the inflation rate will remain high, a reduction in the cost of money cannot be expected in a market in which it was getting scarce and very sought after. In this situation, the financial conglomerates resorted to a series of mechanisms in order to avoid the controls, which in turn increased the cost of money for borrowers. This increase for the most part did not appear in the operational costs of commerce and industry. It was thus that the borrowers were obliged to maintain ever-increasing average outstanding loans, pay commissions, contract insurance with the conglomerate's firms, increase the use of the services that the banks offered them, etc...

An unfreezing of the interest rates cannot alter the situation very much, especially in the case of a severely regulated credit system that limits the growth of the loans to 5 percent during the first 3 months. It must be stressed that there are also a series of operations that are carried out under government regulated interest rates which represent, in the case of the commercial banks, one-half of the total of their operations (rural loans, loans for small and medium-sized enterprises, export loans, etc.).

Within this context it is understandable that businessmen will try to reach a "gentleman's agreement" with bankers in order to try to limit interest rates and also fully reorganize the mechanisms for obtaining loans. It would appear to us at this time that the borrowers should try to obtain the progressive

abolition of the average outstanding loan. This type of reciprocity exists in all countries, but in Brazil it has reached unbelievable proportions, to such an extent that it is more advantageous for an enterprise to pay higher interest rates than maintain a high average outstanding loan. In effect, the interest rates can be registered as overheads in the account books while this cannot be done with the average outstanding loan...

It is also regrettable that the banks oblige their borrowers to transact operations that have nothing to do with obtaining a loan: the obligation to buy shares in their banks, contract insurance policies with the conglomerate's firms, etc.

Unlike the majority of countries throughout the world, regrettably the government in Brazil also authorized financial enterprises to control insurance firms, thus permitting those enterprises to wield improper instruments of pressure, without improving the services that were carried out perfectly by the independent insurance companies. Today we are afraid that it is not possible to return to the previous situation.

At a time when the economy is tending to grow at a slower rate, a system of interest rates must not be favored that stimulates the debt growth of enterprises through negative interest rates. Money must have a cost that is above the inflation rate in order to also stimulate forms of financing other than loans. The healthy competition between financial enterprises should be stimulated within a system of free interest rates. It is a pity that the regulated credit system considerably reduces the benefits arising from that competition.

CSO: 3001

TEXT OF NEW LAW ON VISAS PUBLISHED

Bogota EL TIEMPO in Spanish 7, 8, 9, 10 Jan 81

[Article: "Stay of Foreigners in Colombia Regulated"]

[7 Jan 81, Sec A p 6]

[Text] An ordinance regulating the issuance of visas, the immigration deposit, registration and control, residence and grounds for the expulsion and deportation of foreigners went into effect on 5 January, and will continue until the same day in July.

As EL TIEMPO reported, the new regulations for control of foreigners were issued by the national government on 5 November of last year.

Since we consider them of interest to our readers, we are publishing the complete text thereof in two installments:

Article 1. The entry of foreigners into national territory, as well as their stay and departure, will be subject to the provisions of this decree, which does not preclude the national government's discretionary authority in the matter.

Article 2. Foreigners are those who do not fulfill the requirements for Colombian nationals in accordance with the National Constitution.

Article 3. A foreigner who enters Colombian territory, passes through it, remains temporarily or resides in it must be subject to the provisions of this decree, without precluding the terms of the treaties, conventions, accords and other international commitments that are in effect in the republic.

Article 4. In order to enter national territory, foreigners must have:

- a. A valid passport, travel document, safe-conduct or some other official document issued in their name; and,
- b. The corresponding visa or entry permit.

Article 5. The entry of foreigners into national territory and their departure must take place exclusively through the air, sea, river and land ports duly stipulated by the national government, in all instances accompanied by the pertinent

intervention of the immigration authorities, who will be required to make an inspection in accordance with the regulations issued for that purpose.

Article 6. No foreigner may enter national territory if he is included in one of the following categories:

- a. Suffering from an infectious-contagious disease;
- b. Affected by any mental derangement, unless he is accompanied by someone, and has come for specialized medical treatment;
- c. Lacks an occupation, industry, skill, trade or other lawful means of making a living;
- d. Is, or has been trafficking in narcotics, hallucinogenic drugs or any other similar substance;
- e. Has a record which could jeopardize the security of the state, upset institutional order, or constitute a threat to social calmness;
- f. Has been previously expelled or extradited from the country.

Article 7. Foreigners who have physical limitations on exercising the skill, occupation, industry or trade in which they wish to engage while in the country may only be allowed a temporary, regular or resident visa in special instances, at the decision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Article 8. A new visa will not be granted to a foreigner whose passport contains a valid visa that is in effect for over 90 days.

Article 9. Visas must be issued within the 2 months following their authorization, and must be used within the 6 months following their issuance. Their validity will start to be reckoned as of the date of entry into the country.

Chapter I

On the Categories of Admission

Article 10. For purposes of their admission to Colombia, foreigners are classified as follows:

- a. Diplomatic and consular agents, and other bearers of diplomatic passports;
- b. Holders of special, official or service passports issued by their governments, or by international agencies;
- c. Holders of regular passports;
- d. Holders of travel documents issued by the government of Colombia, or by the governments of the countries in which they have residence;

e. Foreigners exempt from the passport requirement, in accordance with the stipulations in treaties, conventions, accords and other international commitments that are in effect in the republic;

f. Bearers of provisional or emergency passports.

Article 11. The entry of foreigners into national territory will take place with one of the following types of visas: diplomatic visa, courtesy visa, official visa, service visa, temporary visa, regular visa, business visa, resident visa, special resident visa, student visa, tourist visa or card, tourist with automobile card and special border transit permit.

Section I

Diplomatic Visa

Article 12. The chief of a diplomatic mission of Colombia, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in special cases, may grant diplomatic visas to diplomatic agents, consular agents and other foreigners holding diplomatic or similar passports issued by their respective government or an international agency.

Article 13. When a diplomatic visa is issued in the country of origin of the person concerned, it must be requested by the respective foreign ministry, or in the country that is the headquarters of the international agency. When the person concerned is in a different country, the request must be made in writing by his diplomatic mission or the representative of the respective international agency.

Article 14. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs may, in special cases, authorize a consular official of the republic to issue a diplomatic visa.

Article 15. The diplomatic visa will be limited to the duration of the mission, whether it be temporary or permanent, based on the strictest international reciprocity. When a permanent mission has terminated, the bearer of the diplomatic visa will be entitled to use it for a period of 120 days. When this period has expired, if the person wishes to remain in the country he must request an exchange of the latter for a regular visa, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Section II

Courtesy Visa

Article 16. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the chief of the diplomatic mission of the republic may grant courtesy visas to foreigners holding special, official, service or regular passports issued by their respective governments or by international agencies, who are coming to the country on special missions, or who are accredited to it by reason of their high personal rank in the political, cultural, economic or scientific areas. The spouse, as well as the unmarried children of the person entitled to this privilege, may also be granted the aforementioned visa.

Article 17. The chief of a diplomatic mission of the republic may issue courtesy visas to honorary consular agents of foreign nationality.

Article 18. The courtesy visa issued abroad will be valid for up to 3 months, and may be extended within the national territory by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for as long as 1 additional month, as the case may be.

Article 19. Any foreigner who wishes to remain in the country after the expiration of the courtesy visa must submit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the pertinent request for obtaining a temporary or regular visa, as the case may be.

Section III

Official Visa

Article 20. The official visa will be granted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the chief of a diplomatic mission of the republic to foreigners holding special, official or service passports issued by their respective governments or by an international agency, who are coming to the country on temporary missions.

Article 21. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs may, in special cases, authorize a consular official of the republic to issue an official visa.

Article 22. The official visa will be issued free of charge, and its validity will be limited to the period of the temporary mission.

Section IV

Service Visa

Article 23. The service visa will be issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or by the chief of a diplomatic mission of the republic to foreigners holding official, special, service or regular passports, who are coming to the country to render services as experts in connection with official programs for technical assistance or cooperation, experts in integrated fields, holders of grants from international agencies, members of the administrative, technical or service personnel of a diplomatic or consular mission or representatives of an international agency.

Similarly, in special cases, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may authorize the chief of a consular office to issue this visa.

Article 24. For the issuance of a service visa, a request made by the diplomatic or consular mission, or by the representative of the international agency accredited to the national government, is an indispensable requirement. Abroad, the request must be made by the foreign affairs ministry of the respective country, or by the pertinent international agency.

Article 25. The service visa will be issued free of charge, and its validity will be limited to the period of the mission.

For the service personnel of a diplomatic or consular mission, a representative of an international agency, a diplomatic or consular agent or an international official, the validity of the service visa will be limited to the period when the respective work contract is in effect.

Article 26. The holder of a service visa, once his mission or his work contract is terminated, may remain in the country under the protection of that same visa for a period not to exceed 3 months. When this period has expired, he must submit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the pertinent request to obtain a temporary or regular visa, as the case may be.

Section V

Temporary Visa

Article 27. The temporary visa will be issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or by the chief of a consular mission of the republic, duly authorized in each instance, to a foreigner who is coming to the country with the intention of remaining for a period of up to 6 months, and working in the field declared by him upon requesting the visa. When the period for which the temporary visa was issued has expired, the foreigner must request a regular visa in order to be able to remain in the country.

Article 28. The request for a temporary visa must meet the same requirements stated in this decree for the issuance of a regular visa.

Section VI

Regular Visa

Article 29. The regular visa will be issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or by the chief of a consular mission of the republic, to a foreigner who is coming to the country with the intention of remaining for a period of up to 2 years, and working in the field declared by him upon requesting the visa, or in one that is subsequently authorized for him by the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security (DAS). When the 2-year period has expired, the holder of a regular visa may request a resident visa.

Article 30. In order to request a regular visa, it is necessary for the individual:

a. Not to be included in the impediments to admission cited in Article 6 of this decree;

b. To exercise an occupation, skill, trade, industry or commerce that will enable him to make a decent living on national territory for himself and his family within the fourth degree of kindred, based on relationship, or the first civil degree, who are authorized for this same type of visa; or have concluded a work contract with a natural or juridical person legally established in the country.

Article 31. The entry of those under 18 years of age with this type of visa may only be authorized when they are accompanied by adult family members up to the fourth degree of kindred, based on relationship, or the first civil degree, or when they have in the country the protection of persons of recognized moral and economic solvency who will assume responsibility for their care and support.

In the latter instance, the parents or legal representative of the minor must grant him duly legalized permission to travel and remain in Colombia, with identification of the person who will assume responsibility for his care once he arrives on national territory.

Article 32. The ascendant relatives, descendant relatives under 18 years of age and adult, as well as the spouses of persons holding regular visas, will be exempt from the requirements cited in Section b, Article 30, of this decree, provided they are in their care, and do not engage in paid activities.

Article 33. Foreigners who wish to obtain regular visas must submit, through the consulates of the republic, or to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, if the procedure takes place in the country, a request accompanied by the following documents:

a. A certificate of good conduct from the last country of residence issued by a competent authority, duly legalized by a consul of Colombia or by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when this certificate has been issued by a foreign consular mission within national territory;

b. A general medical certificate, issued by a physician duly accredited to the Consulate of Colombia abroad, or to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that the requester does not suffer from any infectious-contagious disease, and is not included in any other category of those cited in Article 6, Section b, of this decree;

c. A document of civil status, such as a birth certificate or marriage certificate, if pertinent, duly legalized by a Colombian consul;

d. A work contract, in triplicate, duly legalized before a notary public, including a clause whereby the business firm or owner promises the national government to pay all the expenses for return to the country of origin or the last residence of the foreigner contracted, as well as for his family, if pertinent, at the termination of the contract, or when the government so requires. When the contract has been concluded outside of the country, the foreigner's signature must be legalized in the respective Consulate of Colombia;

e. A certificate of incorporation and management issued by a competent authority, when the employer is a juridical person;

f. A government record of commercial registry or economic solvency, when the employer is a natural person;

g. Professional competence, through the submission of a university degree, a professional license or a certificate of professional competence, duly legalized by a Colombian consul.

Article 34. When the occupation, skill, trade, industry or commerce is not backed by a work contract, foreigners must pay an immigration deposit, in accordance with the terms of this decree.

Article 35. Foreigners who wish to obtain regular visas as investors must submit the documents cited in Article 33, Sections a, b, c and g, as well as a certificate from the Bank of the Republic stating that the sum coming from abroad is equivalent to or in excess of \$50,000 in United States currency. The validity of the regular visa will be for 6 months, initially, so that the foreigners may prove that the investment was made in accordance with the legal regulations in effect for the area.

Article 36. When several persons are included in the same passport, each one of them must submit the documents stipulated in this decree, unless they are under 8 years of age, and must waive the corresponding rights.

Article 37. For the issuance of a regular visa abroad, the prior authorization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is essential.

[8 Jan 81, Sec A p 3]

[Text] Following is the second part of Decree 2955, issued by the national government and related to the issuance of visas and the control of foreigners.

Section VII

Business Visa

Article 38. Foreigners holding official, service, special or regular passports, who are coming to the country as representatives of foreign public or private entities of a commercial or industrial nature, for periods not exceeding 30 days, must obtain business visas. Their requests must be submitted to the consul of Colombia by the pertinent entity, which will assume responsibility for the activities of its agent in the country.

In order to obtain this visa, the validity of which may be for up to 2 years, allowing its holder to enter the country several times for periods not exceeding 30 days each time, the following requirements must be met: a valid passport, a general medical certificate, a letter from the entity assuming responsibility for the activities of its agent and justifying the issuance of the visa, and attesting to the economic solvency of the entity.

The holder of a business visa will not be obliged to appear before the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) upon his arrival in the country, nor to obtain permission from it to leave national territory.

Article 39. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs may authorize a consular official of the republic to issue the business visa on the terms cited in the previous article, without prior authorization.

Article 40. Foreigners holding official, service, special or regular passports, who are coming to the country as permanent representatives or members of a permanent representative body of foreign public or private entities of a commercial or industrial nature, must obtain a business visa. In addition to the documents stipulated in Article 33 of this decree, the requester must submit a certificate issued by his entity that attests to his status as a permanent representative or a member of the permanent representative body, duly legalized before a Colombian consul. This visa will be valid for 2 years, and allows its holder to leave the country as many times as necessary for the discharge of his duties, without prior permission from the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security.

Section VIII

Resident Visa

Article 41. The resident visa will be issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or by consular officials of the republic, as the case may be, to foreigners holding regular visas, who are previously proven to have remained in the country for a period of time no less than 2 years, on a continuous basis, and who hold transient class foreign identity cards.

Article 42. The validity of the resident visa will be for 5 years, during which their holders may enter and leave the country several times. This visa may be extended for periods of 5 years by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Article 43. The foreign spouse of a Colombian national who comes to the country for the purpose of establishing residence in it will be granted a resident visa, when the following requirements have been previously met:

- a. A marriage certificate, duly legalized by a Colombian consul;
- b. A certificate of good conduct from the last country of residence, issued by a competent authority, and duly legalized by a Colombian consul or by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when this certificate has been issued by a foreign consular mission within national territory;
- c. A general medical certificate issued by a physician duly accredited to the Consulate of Colombia abroad, or to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that the requester does not suffer from any infectious-contagious disease, and is not included in any other category of those cited in Article 6, Section b, of this decree;
- d. Professional competence, through the submission of a university degree, a professional license, or a certificate of professional competence, duly legalized by a Colombian consul, when he wishes to engage in an occupation, skill, trade, industry or commerce within national territory.

Section IX

Special Resident Visa for Political Exiles and Refugees

Article 44. There is created for political exiles and refugees under the protection of the Colombian state the special resident visa, issued only by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Article 45. The special resident visa for political exiles or refugees will have an initial validity for 2 years, which may be extended for periods of 5 years, at the decision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Article 46. The political exiles and refugees holding special resident visas may not engage in activities which may attack the government of their country either directly or indirectly, or which could upset Colombia's diplomatic relations with any country. They will also be subject to the control decided upon by the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security, including the establishment of areas in which they will not be allowed to set up a domicile or residence.

Article 47. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will decide, in each case, on requirements that must be met in the request for a special resident visa, the issuance of which will be free of charge, and exempt from the immigration deposit.

Section X

Student Visa

Article 48. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the duly authorized consuls of the republic, may grant student visas to foreigners who wish to enter the country and remain with that status.

Article 49. For the issuance of a student visa, the following documents are required:

- a. A certificate of good conduct from the last country of residence, issued by a competent authority, and duly legalized by a consul of Colombia or by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when this certificate has been issued by a foreign consular mission within national territory, unless an individual under 14 years of age is involved;
- b. A general medical certificate issued by a physician duly accredited to the Consulate of Colombia abroad, or to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that the requester does not suffer from any infectious-contagious disease, and is not included in any other category of those cited in Article 6, Section b, of this decree;
- c. Documents of civil status, such as a birth certificate or marriage certificate, if pertinent, duly legalized by a Colombian consul;
- d. Permission from the parents or legal representative, duly legalized by a Colombian consul, to travel and remain in Colombia, with identification of the person who will assume responsibility for his care once he arrives on national territory, when the requester is under 18 years of age;
- e. A certificate issued by an intermediate or higher educational institution, recognized by the national government, attesting to the fact that the foreigner has been accepted, and will pursue specific studies in the country;
- f. A certificate of economic solvency of the parents or legal representative, or of the person who will assume responsibility for his care within national territory.

Article 50. Foreigners who enter the country with a student visa may not engage in any lucrative activity unless the laws of the respective country allow Colombian students to engage in paid activities.

Article 51. The student visa allows the foreigner to remain in the country for 1 year, and may be renewed for equal periods until the conclusion of the pertinent studies, after prior evidence has been given that the individual has passed the previous course.

Section XI

Tourist Visa or Card

Article 52. The tourist visa or card will be issued to a foreigner who, without intending to establish his residence, or set himself up in business, or engage in lucrative employment or activity, is coming to the country with sufficient funds, with the intention and purpose of becoming familiar with its various aspects, or of touring it for diversion or recreation. The tourist visa or card will be valid for 90 days, and may be extended for only 30 more days by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Article 53. The tourist visa will be issued free of charge by the paid consuls of the republic, or by honorary consuls duly authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Article 54. The tourist card will be issued by the entities duly authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Relations.

Article 55. For the issuance of the tourist visa or card, it is necessary to submit a valid passport, fare for entering and leaving the country, as well as an international vaccination certificate, if required.

Article 56. The tourist card must contain the following data, in triplicate: given names and surnames, nationality, passport number, birthplace, age, civil status, occupation or trade, country of origin, address of the permanent domicile, country of destination or continuation of travel, and transportation company.

Article 57. If the tourist wishes to remain longer than authorized, he must request a temporary or regular visa from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which, based on its judgment, may or may not authorize the change of visa without the need for leaving national territory.

Article 58. The holder of a tourist card will turn over the entry copy to the immigration authorities of the place of entry, and the exit copy to the emigration authorities in order to leave the country. The third copy will be held by the issuing entity.

Article 59. A foreigner who enters the country as a tourist will have the following facilities: exemption from registration with the authorities of the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security; exemption from exit taxes and other immigration requirements, provided the departure takes place within the period which guarantees him his status as a tourist.

Section XII

Tourist With Automobile Card

Article 60. The tourist with automobile card will be issued to foreigners who are coming to the country with their own vehicle, arriving from one of the countries with which there is an international agreement in effect on the subject.

In addition to the information included on the regular tourist card, the tourist with automobile card will contain the following data: owner of the vehicle, description thereof, insurance company and number of the insurance policy covering damage to third parties within national territory. The tourist with automobile card will also carry a notice stating that the vehicle may not be sold to anyone within national territory.

Article 61. In order to obtain the tourist with automobile card, the foreigner must identify himself personally before the respective Colombian consular official, and submit the papers on ownership of the vehicle.

Article 62. Foreigners who travel holding the tourist with automobile card must comply with the regular immigration requirements.

Article 63. It is incumbent on the General Department of Customs to issue regulations on the control of the vehicles protected by the card to which this section relates.

Article 64. A tourist who has entered the country with this card may not leave Colombian territory without the vehicle protected thereby. Otherwise, the tourist must place the vehicle at the disposal of the Customs Department, in accordance with the rules established by the regulations specified in the previous article.

Article 65. The tourist with automobile card will have the same force as the tourist card for which this decree provides regulations.

Section XIII

Transit Visa or Card

Article 66. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security, may grant to foreigners who have arrived in the country by force majeure and who do not have the respective visa a transit card that is valid for up to 15 days, which may not be extended.

Article 67. The following may also enter Colombian territory in the capacity of transients:

- a. Foreigners who are forced to land on national territory in order to travel to the country of destination.
- b. Crew members of ships, airplanes or any means of transportation who arrive in the country's international ports or airports, and who are included on the crew lists.
- c. Drivers and other personnel of international land transportation firms.

Article 68. The paid consuls of the republic, as well as the honorary consuls duly authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will issue, free of charge, the transit visa to foreigners who are in the situation described in the previous article, which will be valid for 15 days, with no possible extension.

Article 69. The transit card will consist of two detachable sections, for entry and exit, and must contain the following information: given names and surnames, nationality, passport number, birthplace, age, civil status, occupation or trade, country of origin, address of the permanent domicile, country of destination or continuation of travel, and transportation company.

Article 70. For the issuance of a transit visa or card, it is necessary to submit a valid passport, fare for entering and/or leaving Colombia, as the case may be, and an international vaccination certificate, if required, and one must be provided with a valid visa for the country of destination or transit.

Section XIV

Special Border Transit Permit

Article 71. Border transit is interpreted as the incidental passage of persons coming from border localities to Colombia, within the zone established by the international treaties that are in effect, and through places established by the national government.

Article 72. The special border transit permit given to nationals of the bordering countries residing in the border zones is used for entry and temporary stay in the respective Colombian border zone, and for leaving it, in accordance with the methods established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for each instance.

Article 73. For the issuance of the special border transit permit, the requester must submit the following documents: proof of area of residence, a passport or another document which fully attests to the identity of the individual concerned. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will regulate the issuance of this permit.

Article 74. The special border transit permits will be issued only by the respective Colombian consul, in three copies, which must contain the following information: given names and surnames, nationality, civil status, occupation or trade and address of the permanent domicile, and must have a photo attached to each. They will be valid for 180 days, which may not be extended, for several entries, and will only permit their holders to stay no longer than 30 days each time.

The consuls will be required to prepare, in triplicate, a list of the special permits issued monthly, and to distribute it as follows: the original to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the first copy to the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security and the second copy to the consulate.

Chapter II

On the Immigration Deposit

Article 75. Every foreigner who enters the country with a regular visa, but for the exceptions made herein, will be subject to the payment of an immigration deposit equivalent to the price of the economy class air fare to return to his country of origin, taken by a company registered with the IATA, plus 30 percent of the price of that fare.

Article 76. The Colombian consul whom the Ministry of Foreign Affairs authorizes to issue a regular visa, subject to the immigration deposit, will record in the passport the sum that the foreigner must pay upon arriving in the country to the immigration authorities, in the form of an immigration deposit.

Article 77. At the time of his first registration with the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security, the foreigner holding a regular visa subject to the immigration deposit will be required to pay to the order of the bank account of the Cashier's Office of the Administrative Department of Security the sum recorded by the Colombian consul on the respective passport.

Article 78. The following are exempt from the obligation of the immigration deposit:

- a. Foreigners hired by government or semigovernmental entities, as well as their spouses and minor children;
- b. Foreign spouses of Colombian nationals, and their children;
- c. Individuals who, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, may be exempted from this requirement;
- d. Foreigners who arrive in the country covered by a work contract which includes the clause on unconditional return.

[9 Jan 81, Sec A p 12]

[Text] Following is the third part of Decree 2955, issued by the national government and related to the issuance of visas and control of foreigners.

Article 79. The immigration deposit will be returned to the individual concerned, or to his legal representative, in the following instances:

- a. When he leaves the country permanently, within the period of validity of the regular visa;
- b. In the event of death, to the legally recognized heirs; and,
- c. Upon obtaining a resident visa in Colombia.

Article 80. Immigration deposits which are not claimed within the 3 years following the date of entry of the holder of a regular visa subject to that deposit will be used to pay the expenses incurred by the exit of undesirable foreigners.

Article 81. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will determine, at the proper time, the amount of the immigration deposit, country by country, in accordance with the terms of Article 75 of this decree.

Chapter III

Registration, Identification and Control of Foreigners

Article 82. Every foreigner who enters the country with a temporary, regular, business (Article 40), resident, special resident or student visa is required to appear before the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security in Bogota, or before the respective section of the same agency, within the 5 days following their arrival, for the pertinent purposes.

Article 83. A file will be kept on every foreigner registered with the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security, or with the respective section of the same agency, containing the information of a technical nature needed to enable the aforementioned department to exercise proper control.

Article 84. The foreigner identity cards will have a national numbering system regardless of their place of issuance.

Article 85. The foreigner must supply the necessary information for the preparation of his foreigner identity card, bound by oath. When the passport shows signs of forging or does not meet the legal requirements, the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security will refuse to issue the corresponding identity card, without precluding the holding of the respective investigation.

Article 86. The issuance of the transient class and resident class foreigner identity card will be subject to the rates set by the national government.

Article 87. While the request for a resident visa is being decided on, the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security may extend the validity of the transient identity card up to 90 days.

Article 88. Holders of diplomatic and service visas will be identified within national territory with the identity card issued by the Ministry of Foreign Relations' General Department of Protocol.

Holders of official visas will be identified by presenting their passports, unless the Ministry of Foreign Relations' General Department of Protocol can issue them an identity card in accordance with the terms of international treaties which are in effect.

Holders of courtesy, business (Article 38) or tourist visas, tourist or transit cards and border permits will be identified by presenting their passports. Holders of temporary, regular, business (Article 40), resident, special resident and student visas may only identify themselves with the foreigner identity card issued by the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security.

Article 89. With the exception of the holders of diplomatic, courtesy, official service and tourist visas, tourist and transit cards and border permits and transit cards, every foreigner must notify the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security of any change in domicile, or notify the sectional office or operational post of the same agency thereof, within the 5 days following the occurrence of the aforementioned change.

Article 90. The judicial and police authorities, and the officials for fiscal proceedings, will notify the Administrative Department of Security of the initiation of action, within their jurisdiction, against foreigners; as well as changes

of location, or transfer to other authorities and, finally, the results of the action.

Article 91. When the pertinent complaints for police-related violations committed by foreigners are not filed, or charges are not brought for crimes the investigation of which requires a complaint by one of the parties, the Administrative Department of Security will officially carry out the preliminary investigation of the case, in order to fully ascertain how it is being handled, for purposes of the penalties that may be in order.

Article 92. In hotels, boarding houses or houses of residence, the owner or manager will keep a special register with continuous numbering of each foreigner lodged therein, including the following information: date of arrival, given names and surnames, foreign identity card or passport, nationality, occupation or trade, domicile, place of origin and place of destination.

Article 93. The establishments cited in the previous article will send the list of foreign guests every day to the following offices: in Bogota, to the Administrative Department of Security; and in the other towns, to the sections, sub-sections or posts indicated by the same entity; and, in their absence, to the leading political authority in the respective locality, for inspection and examination.

Article 94. The registers cited in the foregoing articles must be submitted for review and consultation every time that the authorities so demand.

Article 95. Any natural or juridical person who leases residences or rooms to foreigners must report this in writing, in Bogota, to the Administrative Department of Security, and in the other cities and towns of the republic, to the authorities responsible for the registration and control of foreigners, within the 5 days following the concluding of the leasing contract, indicating the given names and surnames of the tenant, nationality, and number and date of the foreigner identity card or passport.

Article 96. Every employer of a foreigner must require that he submit his foreigner identity card, and must notify the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security, or a sectional office or executive post thereof, and, in their absence, the leading political authority of the locality, within the 48 hours following the initiation of that employment.

Article 97. With the exception of the holders of diplomatic, courtesy, official service, business and tourist visas, tourist and transit cards and border permits and transit cards, every foreigner over 14 years of age must submit the following documents to the emigration authorities in order to leave the country:

a. A current certificate of no unpaid taxes;

b. An exit permit issued by the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security.

Article 98. The foreign spouses of Colombian citizens holding resident visas in accordance with Article 43 of this decree will be exempt from the requirements stipulated in the previous article for leaving the country.

Article 99. To allow the exit of foreign minors who were under patria potestas or guardianship, there must be written authorization, duly authenticated, from the parents, the father or the mother, as the case may be, or from their legal representative.

Article 100. The Administrative Department of Security will prevent the departure from the country of any foreigner against whom there is an arrest warrant, a valid detention order, an order to proceed, a prison sentence awaiting execution or an injunction from any competent national or foreign authority.

Chapter IV

On Indefinite Residence

Article 101. At the end of 2 years of continuous stay, with a regular visa, a foreigner interested in acquiring indefinite residence will request it from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which may or may not grant it, through the resident visa.

Article 102. Continuous stay is interpreted as a stay in which there has been no interruption for over 90 days in the same year.

Article 103. The request for indefinite residence will contain: the given names and surnames, nationality, foreigner identity card number, domicile, and location of work. The individual concerned must also submit a judicial certificate and a certificate of good conduct issued by the Administrative Department of Security, which also records all the entries into and exits from the country.

Article 104. Indefinite residence is forfeited by absence from the country for more than 1 year.

Chapter V

On the Exercise of an Occupation and a Change Therein

Article 105. A foreigner who has proven a certain occupation or trade for purposes of his entry into the country with a regular visa must exercise it for a minimal period of 2 years. When this period has expired, he may request of the Administrative Department of Security a change in or addition to the occupation or trade.

Article 106. When a foreigner becomes physically incapacitated to continue exercising the declared occupation or trade, the Administrative Department of Security may grant him the change before the period cited in the previous article has expired; for which purpose he must submit to that department a certificate from the Institute of Legal Medicine stating whether the incapacity is permanent or temporary.

Article 107. When recording a foreigner in its files, the Administrative Department of Security will make a record of the authorized occupation or trade.

Article 108. A foreigner who is proven to be exercising an occupation or trade different from the one declared, without prior authorization from the Administrative Department of Security, will be given by that department a period not to exceed 30 days to leave the country.

Article 109. When the foreigner has entered the country with a regular visa based on a work contract, when the latter terminates for any reason, both the employer and the worker must notify the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Administrative Department of Security, within 30 days prior to its termination. Failure to meet the requirement stipulated herein will entail for the employer the obligation to make immediate payment, as soon as the aforementioned period expires, to the order of the Administrative Department of Security, of the price of the fare for the foreigner and his family to return to their country of origin.

If the worker fails to give notice, he will be deported in accordance with the provisions of the pertinent chapter.

Article 110. When the worker gives the notice involved in the previous article, he will be required to ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for confirmation of the regular visa with which he entered the country, or for the issuance of a resident visa, if he has already remained in it for 2 years. It will be within the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to grant or deny it, taking into account for this purpose the background of the individual concerned, and the advantage to the nation.

The confirmation of this visa or the issuance of the resident visa requires that the requester submit a new work contract, or prove, through prior payment of the immigration deposit, his financial ability to engage in other activities on his own.

Article 111. If the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not willing to confirm the regular visa or to issue the resident visa involved in the previous article, it will report this to the Administrative Department of Security, so that the foreigner may leave the country within a period not to exceed 90 days. If he does not do so, he will be expelled.

Article 112. When the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirms a regular visa, the employer who brought the worker to Colombia will be exempt from any obligation based on the initial contract.

Article 113. The request for a change in or addition to an occupation or trade will contain the given names and surnames of the individual concerned, his nationality, foreigner identity card number, domicile, and location of work. It will then explain his reasons for requesting the change or addition, and will add the evidence attesting to the fact that he exercised the previous occupation continuously for 2 years. It will, in addition, offer proof of his fitness for the new occupation; and, if he is going to exercise it in a dependent manner, the authenticated copy of the respective contract and the registration of the employer in the Chamber of Commerce or the Banking Superintendency, or else certification attesting to his economic solvency.

Article 114. The Administrative Department of Security will carry out the investigation aimed at establishing the truthfulness of the facts cited in the previous article.

Article 115. The request for an addition to or change in occupation or trade will be decided on within the 30 days following the submission of all the documentation cited in Article 113 of this decree, through an order from the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security; and if it is not decided on within this period of time, it will be considered to be granted.

[10 Jan 81, Sec A p 6]

[Text] Following is the final part of Decree 2955 issued by the national government and related to the issuance of visas and control of foreigners.

Chapter VI

On Penalties

Article 116. The Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security, through a resolution showing cause, against which motions to set aside and remedies of appeal will be allowed, and will be granted with a devolutive effect, will impose the penalties listed below:

a. Fines of from 1,000 to 5,000 pesos on foreigners or nationals, as the case may be, who commit the following offenses: 1. Failing to give notice of a change in residence within the following 5 days. 2. Not appearing before the authorities of the Administrative Department of Security within the period of 5 working days after the date of arrival in Colombia if, based on the terms of this decree, they are obligated to do so. 3. Delaying over 30 days in renewing the expired foreigner identity card. 4. Giving erroneous information when registering in hotels, boarding houses or family residences. 5. Not visiting the authorities of the aforementioned department on time, when they are summoned in writing. 6. Refusing to show their identity papers to the authorities. 7. Remaining in the country longer than the time specified on the respective visas, except in cases of force majeure that have been duly attested to. 8. Failure by the parents or legal representatives to have foreign minors appear when, at the age of 14 years, they must be registered with the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security. 9. Employing a foreigner without requiring him to show the pertinent foreigner identity card, or for an occupation different from that legally authorized. 10. Owners, managers or officials of hotels, boarding houses or family residences who failed to comply with the terms of Articles 92, 93, 94 and 95 of this decree.

b. The amount of the immigration deposit, for a foreigner to whom it was returned to leave the country, and who did not do so.

c. Fines of from 10,000 to 20,000 pesos, without precluding other legal penalties, for natural or juridical persons who conclude fictitious work contracts so that foreigners may obtain a visa, a return of the immigration deposit, or a change in or addition to an occupation or trade, and which in general are designed to serve as evidence to the authorities on behalf of foreigners.

d. Fines of from 30,000 to 50,000 pesos, without precluding other legal penalties, for air, sea, river or land transportation firms which carry foreigners into the country without the pertinent legal documentation. If the Foreign Division authorities had to refuse a foreigner entry into the country for the foregoing reasons, the company which transported him will also be required to return him to his place of origin at its own expense.

e. Fines of from 50,000 to 100,000 pesos, without precluding other legal penalties, for air, sea, river or land transportation firms which facilitate the illegal exit of foreigners from national territory.

Article 117. The fines cited in the previous article will be paid to the order of the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security in Bogota, or the Cashier's Office of the respective section of the same agency, within the 5 days following the notification thereof.

Chapter VII

On Expulsion and Deportation

Article 118. A foreigner who commits any of the following offenses will be expelled from the country, without precluding any legal penalties that may be in order:

1. Those who enter violating the regulations established in this decree;
2. Those who at any time show a false identity card or other false identity documents with obvious signs of forging;
3. Those who make false statements when enrolling in the Foreign Division registry;
4. Those without capital invested in the country or who lack an authorized occupation from which they can earn a living;
5. Those who engage in the illegal dealing or trafficking of hard drugs and narcotics, or white slave trafficking; and, in general, those who commit acts contrary to public morality or who display antisocial conduct;
6. Those who defraud the National Treasury in any way;
7. Those who have been convicted of crimes which are punishable by imprisonment for over 6 months and whose sentence does not call for expulsion;
8. Those who, without justified cause, remain in the country longer than the time specified on the respective visa or entry document, for which reason they have been previously punished with a fine;
9. Those who have given cause for the cancellation of the visa;
10. Those who interfere in any way with the country's domestic policy;

11. Those who spread or foster in any way doctrines which tend to upset the social order and the trade unions through subversive activities which, in the judgment of the national government, constitute a threat to the Colombian state;
12. Those who attempt to hamper the good progress of Colombia's international relations, or who try to discredit the country or its legitimate institutions;
13. Those who engage in agitation and propaganda activities against the governments of countries with which Colombia maintains diplomatic relations;
14. Those who violate regulations on access to places, documents or goods which, for reasons of national security, are kept under the control of the civilian or military authorities;
15. Those who deal in arms or items for the exclusive use of the Armed Forces, without the pertinent permit;
16. Those who bribe or attempt to bribe public officials;
17. Those who have been convicted of fraudulent bankruptcy, if the sentence does not call for expulsion;
18. Those who take part in the leadership, development or financing of illegal called strikes;
19. Those who are revealed to be notoriously insolvent;
20. Those who, having been assigned an area for their residence, or banned access to a certain location, violate those rules;
21. Those who engage in usury in any way;
22. Those who make false work contracts designed to serve as evidence to the authorities, without precluding the other penalties established in the law and in this decree;
23. Those who, while in the country, promote the entry of other foreigners with false promises of a work contract, or by supplying visas or documents for entry or residence;
24. Those who make use of minors to commit crimes or offenses;
25. Those who have been fined on two or more occasions in one year for violations of this decree;
26. Those who participate in industrial sabotage or espionage in business firms established in the country;
27. Those who are given a period by the Administrative Department of Security to leave the country, based on the instances stipulated in this decree, and fail to do so.

Article 119. The heads of the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security, based on the information obtained by the investigation section of the respective unit, through a resolution showing cause, will order the expulsion from the country of foreigners who commit any of the offenses cited in the previous article or who in any way violate the legal provisions on national security and juridical order. Motions to set aside and remedies of appeal will be allowed against such a decision, and may be filed within 5 days of the notification thereof.

The resolution for expulsion will have an immediate effect, and the appeals will be granted with a devolutive effect.

Article 120. When a foreigner has been notified of a resolution for expulsion and cannot leave the country within the period that has been specified to him for reasons beyond his control, he will be subjected to constant surveillance and control by the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security, until the measure can be carried out.

Article 121. An expelled foreigner will depart bound for his country of origin or the one from which he came, or any other that will permit his entry.

Article 122. A foreigner subject to a resolution for expulsion may designate a certified and registered attorney to be his proxy during the proceedings. In the event that he has no attorney, an official one will be appointed for him, unless the foreigner expressly voices his desire to act on his own behalf.

Article 123. The failure of the foreigner to appear will not prevent the normal course of the expulsion proceedings.

Article 124. A foreigner who has been expelled may not return to the country.

Article 125. The heads of the Foreign Division of the Administrative Department of Security, at their own decision, may deport outright any foreigner who, according to the pertinent information, has committed the offenses cited in Nos 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 25 and 27 of Article 118 of this decree.

Article 126. The fact that a foreigner has been deported does not constitute an impediment to the issuance of a visa in accordance with this decree.

General Provisions

Article 127. All the provisions in this decree are subject to the stipulations contained in treaties, conventions, accords and other international commitments that are in effect in the republic.

Article 128. Every visa will be issued according to the terms indicated in this decree, unless the duration of the respective passport does not so permit.

Article 129. An individual who meets the requirements established in Article 8 of the National Constitution, and who holds a passport issued by a foreign government, for purposes of this decree, may only be considered a Colombian national.

Article 130. The minor child of a Colombian father or mother, born abroad, and holding a foreign passport, who is coming to the country for the purpose of establishing his domicile in order to comply with Article 8 of the National Constitution, will be issued a temporary visa for 6 months, with the sole proof of Colombian nationality of one of his parents.

Article 131. When a resident visa is issued, the employer's obligation cited in the clause on return, which is unconditional in the work contract, to pay the costs of the return of the worker and his family to their country of origin, ceases.

Article 132. It is within the discretionary authority of the national government to issue and cancel visas, as well as to authorize a change therein, within the territory of the republic.

Article 133. Diplomatic, courtesy, official, service, tourist, tourist with automobile, special resident, and transit visas, and special border transit permits, will be issued free of charge.

Temporary, regular, business, resident, and student visas, as well as tourist and transit cards, will be subject to the rates specified by the national government, without precluding the terms of international treaties that are in effect.

Article 134. All provisions of equal or lesser juridical rank which run counter to the terms of this decree are abrogated.

Article 135. Foreigners holding current visas issued in accordance with the terms of the previous legislation will have a period of 180 days to adjust their legal status to the terms established in this decree.

2909

CSO: 3010

LEADER OF DEMOCRATIC LEFT OUTLINES PARTY OBJECTIVES

Quito EL COMERCIO in Spanish 11 Jan 81 p 3

[Text] The national director of Democratic Left (ID), Raul Baca, commenting on the political prospects of his party in 1981, stressed its total independence from government actions.

However, he added, when there are points of political agreement on given proposals, particularly concerning defense and the consolidation of the democratic system, "we have backed up the Executive; when we feel there is no reason for the Executive's actions, we have criticized them. Thus, our independence is maintained at all costs."

On the other hand, referring to his party's actions this year, he noted that in the first place there has been a series of evaluations of the recent election, not just to find out the party's relative position in the results, but basically to analyze the measures that must be taken within ID's political objectives.

He stated that the first step, a move that will last the entire year, "is what we will do at the end of this month. The specific goal will be to gather together all the Democratic Left district and provincial council members that were elected last 7 December."

This meeting, he stressed, will plan the municipal and provincial actions to be taken in the republic, considering that ID has won representation in 80 percent of the nation's districts.

The party's intention, explained Baca, is to coordinate the activities of the ID representatives, so that there will be a coherent party policy in each delegation; to determine the working methods of the district and provincial councils; and to create a permanent party office in Quito that will be able to streamline the functions of party representatives and ensure their success.

"This," he emphasized, "will give rise to periodic meetings for the purpose of evaluating the work done in the various parts of the country by these officials, and the methodology for setting up plans of action."

He added that if only that objective were achieved, by next year there would be a global planning program that could lead to regional planning in many cases. At

present, such planning does not exist even among agencies such as the National Development Council (CONADE).

In addition, he indicated, the organization of the party will progress further, with a view to completing political organization on the parish level. "We have a very clear district structure in this country, and our main objective will be to reach the grassroots levels to comply with the clear provisions of the Party Law," he commented.

He stressed that a third objective of the party is the training of leaders; the establishment of leadership schools throughout the country by Democratic Left is already a fact. "Thus," he said, "in the next few days we will open the leadership school in Pichincha. In this manner," he concluded, "I think these objectives will define the position of our party in a period that fortunately has no elections scheduled."

B926

CSO: 3010

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF PAST YEAR ANALYZED

Quito EL COMERCIO in Spanish 1 Jan 81 p 1

[Article by Cristobal Zambrano]

[Text] Controversial, difficult, full of battles and pitfalls. The final evaluation of 1980 reveals that it was not a very auspicious year for politics, but it will no doubt be considered a stimulating experience that will make 1981 a year of achievements.

Amid the tangled web that hindered the government's actions, one accomplishment that stands out for the three branches of government is the consolidation of democracy. Sometimes the process was difficult, overshadowed by recent memories of a decade of dictatorship, the coups and the actions of the "black hands" still fresh in our minds.

The dominant theme in politics until the middle of the year was the executive-legislative standoff, which just about led the country to a confrontation of unpredictable consequences in the form of a popular consultation.

The battle immersed the country in polemics, hampered administrative progress, stirred up political squabbles and shook the populace with fear for the future of democracy.

The struggle was definitely harmful to the National House of Representatives as well as the government, because time was wasted in the political give-and-take and programs and laws designed to benefit the nation were set back.

The Jurisdictional Function was a silent witness to the battle; equally idle and even inoperative in some cases, it did not grease the cogs of the lumbering machinery of justice.

The decision on the Calderon case, left hanging for 2 years, was not made in 1980, for example.

It has been said that the struggle was like a glass that was being filled drop by drop ever since the presidential campaign when Roldos, Hurtado, Bucaram and Trujillo, that is members of the Concentration of Popular Forces (CFP) and Christian Democrats, were crisscrossing the country.

The long period between the primary election (16 July 1978) and the second election (29 April 1979) had a strong impact on this battle, and on the passion of the allied forces, dissimilar in their strength, ideology and administrative capacity.

The dictatorship's "ploy," as it was later termed, in calling joint elections for both the presidency and the legislature in April 1979, fueled the flames of controversy even further. In the drawing up of slates for legislative seats, differences among CFP leaders were exaggerated, and the possibility was raised that Christian Democrats (with no party) would be elected to the House and become defenders of the government and stumbling blocks for Bucaram. Incredible.

In the first sessions of the House, CFP members and Christian Democrats were united. The rifts appeared when deputies began making statements and legal questions such as the status of district and provincial council members named by the dictatorship were discussed. The conflict between CFP members and Christian Democrats, and later among CFP members, began to heat up during the executive-legislative controversy, which exploded when Secretary of Administration Alejandro Roman accused legislators of being demagogues.

From then on, there were harsh battles between the Conservative-CFP sector and the government, backed up by representatives of Popular Democracy (by then a political party) and other parties such as Democratic Left (ID).

The controversy was manifested in countless laws passed by the legislative majority that never saw the light of day because of presidential vetoes. In this game of ping-pong between legislative action and presidential vetoes, time, hope and money went down the drain along with public aspirations. The government tried to throw off the "patriarchs of compromise" with a program of constitutional reforms, but the plan was pulverized in the House and later destroyed in an abortive plebiscite.

The House responded by initiating a series of political hearings and examinations of ministers, which paralyzed the administration. The government came out smelling like a rose, however, because the censures were unsuccessful.

The CFP-Conservative rule ended on 10 August with the victory of Raul Baca as president of the House, but the opposition consolidated its voice in the legislature, and the complications and difficulties continued.

Baca, in a regular House session, kept issuing subpoenas to ministers to be questioned at hearings.

The plenary session, on which hopes had been centered since 9 October, was a failure. Not a single important law was passed. The government, on the other hand, was unable to uproot administrative immorality or escape the dilemmas of public administration, and did not achieve the goal it had set forth for itself. The National Development Plan had to be adjusted to the limits of the state budget, and there seemed to be no hope of an effective or rapid solution to the domestic problems resulting from inflation and the high cost of living.

The government was victorious, however, in terms of its international image. Riobamba, Santa Marta, international politics and the visit to Mexico, all shed favorable light on Ecuador.

The year came to a close with the sectional elections of 7 December, when there was a reordering of political forces. Once again, the battle claimed its victims.

The Alfarist Radical Front, a party that attracted little attention, won a spectacular victory in Guayas and first place in national voting.

The Democratic Left, which had inspired such high hopes, achieved its objectives in Pichincha and the mountain region in general, but it was crushed in Guayas. As a result, it relinquished the championship title. Without a doubt, the ID will be relegated to third place, after Popular Democracy, which won an acceptable number of votes in the provinces and meritoriously placed second in Guayas (with Abdala Bucaram).

Aside from the reordering of political forces, the elections had another important historical consequence in that they eliminated from public office the last appointees of the dictatorship.

Much more is expected of 1981: Significant laws are expected to be passed by the House, such as the land traffic and transportation law, the higher education act, etc. From the government, we expect results, and from the Jurisdictional Function, justice.

8926

CSO: 3010

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, INTERNATIONAL ISSUES SURVEYED

Quito EL COMERCIO in Spanish 11 Jan 81 p 1

[Article by Victor Hinostrosa]

[Text] Now that the special session of the National House of Representatives has been called off and the institutional crisis of the police has been overcome, the Roldos Administration will orient its policy toward the curbing of speculation on the food items of the family consumer basket, and implementing the operational plan for 1981.

As far as domestic politics are concerned, the government will examine its relations with the 13 parties that were officially accepted by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and will establish a means whereby the parties can exchange ideas so as to ensure greater support for his administration in the new session of the National House of Representatives that will begin next 10 August.

For their part, the political parties have announced future assemblies in order to restore honor to party functions and determine the positions they will take toward the government and their conduct in Parliament. They will also analyze the results of last December's election, which are having an impact on traditional party structures, and engage in some self-criticism.

The government has launched a study of Ecuador's position in the world, with special attention to its bilateral trade relations and its future prospects.

The changes made by Interior Minister Carlos Feraud in the high echelons of the National Police, according to political observers, have managed to overcome the crisis in that institution in the first week of 1981.

Police Commander General Francisco Preire, for "service reasons," asked that some 42 general, superior and subordinate officers in nearly all the police districts in the country, be relieved of duty.

This change took place after former Police Commander General Joel Zaldumbide was replaced.

The interior minister stated at a press conference that he had been forced to request the general's resignation when a serious disciplinary problem was discovered. The secretary of state announced there that other changes would be made in the provincial commands and the General Staff of the National Police.

The government, of course, recognized that the police had been suffering from unresolved problems, he noted, pointing out that there was a need for more channels through which the rank and file could express their concerns and desires. This method would lead to a timely and legal solution, and eliminate once and for all the de facto solutions that had existed.

However, President Jaime Roldos observed that the National Police is an institution in which order and discipline must prevail.

The vast majority of Ecuadorians applauded the announcement by National House of Representatives President Raul Baca Carbo that there would be no special session. The idea behind the session was to expedite the Organic Law governing the legislative function, since at present there is no such law. The earlier law, passed by Parliament when Asaad Bucaram was president, was opposed by the Executive on grounds of unconstitutionality.

Interior Minister Carlos Feraud will take advantage of this parliamentary recess to contact the representatives of the various blocs in order to reconcile the positions of the Executive and the Legislature, and to get the House to take a more positive position with regard to the Executive.

During this week, Finance Minister Rodrigo Paz will announce the indispensable measures that will be needed to cut the high cost of living, prevent a currency devaluation and obtain greater export revenues.

The Economic Front held a meeting yesterday to study whether or not it should raise bank interest rates.

The Cabinet will also hold a special meeting next Friday, 16 January, and also on 23 January, to analyze in detail the 1981 Operational Plan of the National Development Plan that the Executive must prepare in accordance with the budget approved for this year.

The National Development Council (CONADE) submitted a draft of the operational plan to each of the cabinet members for prior examination.

Foreign Minister Alfonso Barrera is also writing a special report on the analysis of Ecuador's diplomatic and trade relations with more than 60 countries.

Another study is being conducted regarding Ecuador's future relations with the government of U.S. President-elect Ronald Reagan, who will take office next 20 January.

Finally, Barrera announced that on 29 January, on the occasion of the 39th anniversary of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, a communique will be issued in which the government will make a pronouncement on the border treaty with Peru.

"We cannot," said Barrera, "be satisfied with a treaty that was imposed by force and that violated all the norms of international law, including the international norms of America."

8926

CSO: 3010

ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES PREDICTED FOR 1981

Quito EL COMERCIO in Spanish 31 Dec 80 pp 1-2

[Article by Manuel Maldonado Posso]

[Text] Guayaquil, 30 Dec — The year that is drawing to a close was marked by serious economic imbalances. If these imbalances are not corrected, they could intensify and give President Roldos reason to believe that 1981 will be a difficult year.

Today was virtually the last day of the year in terms of formal economic activity.

The commercial banks of the nation will not be open to the public tomorrow, on orders from the General Superintendency of Banks, so that they can balance their books for the end of the year.

Commercial activities have languished after intense movement during the pre-Christmas season, when transactions burgeoned thanks to the payment of the thirteenth salary and additional bonuses to the working class.

President Jaime Roldos and the government's economic officials have warned that 1981 will be a difficult year. Measures will have to be taken to avoid a recession in the Ecuadorean economy.

In 1980 the goal of a 5 percent growth rate in the GNP was not achieved, due to unforeseen imbalances in the exportation of basic agricultural products. Prices of these goods took a beating on the international market.

Economic authorities have stated that we will probably have to tighten our belts next year in order to prevent the simultaneous inflationary distortions and recessionary trends that could result from excessive liberalization of the economy.

International problems have had a severe impact on Ecuador's economy because of what is known as imported inflation, which boosts the costs of production.

For example, Ecuadorean industry is suffering from a high degree of dependence on foreign supplies. The rise in prices of capital goods, intermediate inputs and even certain raw materials used in the Ecuadorean industrial process, has driven up production costs.

In addition, the cost of labor has gone up dramatically as a result of wage adjustments that came into effect early in the year, and the shortening of the workday as of October.

All these national production cost hikes have gone hand in hand with another phenomenon that has caused a certain recession in the economy, national budget distortions and even a dampening of the productive process.

This phenomenon is the dramatic drop in the value of traditional exports, which has resulted in a crisis among Ecuadoreans involved in the sale of bananas, cacao, coffee and other strategically important products. These goods provide a living for thousands of people, a reasonable monetary reserve, and adequate financing for the government's general budget.

The deterioration of the terms of trade, meaning that industrial production is increasingly costly and national agricultural products bring in lower prices, has become one of the principal factors in the nation's economic slump.

If it were not for the high monetary value of oil revenues, the Ecuadorean economy would be suffering from the same severe crisis as other Hispanoamerican nations.

However, the squandering of hydrocarbon resources continues through the uncontrolled consumption of what has become the cheapest gasoline in the world.

At less than 17 U.S. cents per gallon, gasoline in Ecuador costs one-fourth the price of soda pop.

This is one of the reasons why national consumption has risen at an average rate of 12 to 15 percent a year, which in turn could cause Ecuador to cease being an exporter and become an importer of petroleum. This will surely happen if nothing is done to step up exploration and exploitation of new oil wealth in the east and the depths of the Gulf of Guayaquil and the areas near Manabi.

8926
CSO: 3010

FMLN'S VILLALOBOS DISCUSSES MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN MORAZAN

Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 5 Jan 81 pp 2, 10

[Interview with Joaquin Villalobos, by Lucas Jelin in Morazan; date not given]

[Text] San Salvador, 4 Jan--The commander in chief of the ERP [People's Revolutionary Army] and member of the unified revolutionary leadership of the FMLN [Parabundo Marti National Liberation Front], Joaquin Villalobos, has announced that within the next few weeks everything will be ready for the decisive battles in El Salvador.

In an exclusive interview with the NEW NICARAGUA AGENCY, somewhere in Morazan, located 167 kilometers east of here, the constant setting for some of the bloodiest battles between the army and the guerrilla forces, the commander Villalobos discussed the characteristics of the Salvadoran armed forces and spoke about the level of maturity of the FMLN's unity.

Villalobos, who is about 28 years old, also explained the achievements of the guerrilla movement in Morazan and called on all the peoples of the world to demonstrate their support and solidarity with the cause of the Salvadoran people.

The text of our conversation with commander Villalobos follows:

Question: What is the status of the struggle of the Salvadoran people right now?

Answer: After 50 years of struggling, our people have brought together a great number of factors that make it possible for us to glimpse our certain victory for the coming months, during which the revolutionary forces will go on the offensive against the enemy.

On the international level, the Christian Democratic military junta is almost totally isolated, and only the U.S. imperialists are supporting it.

In this area of Morazan, we are continuing to see the presence of U.S. advisers with the military forces of the army, while on a national level the combat morale of the people, the increase in their military power, and their organization, suggest to us that in the next few weeks everything will be ready for us to move toward the decisive battles for the liberation of our country.

Question: How much unity is there in the revolutionary forces that make up the FMLN?

Answer: This is a continuing process, one which has taken a great deal of work, but which is now in one of its phases of greatest maturity, both concerning the unity of the revolutionary forces and the process of monolithic unification of the democratic and progressive forces of our nation, around the political plan developed in the FDR [Democratic Revolutionary Front] program which is fully supported by the FMLN.

We feel that this program contains the best interests of the middle classes, of the small and medium property owners, and of the patriotic military. All of the political trends and currents have joined forces around this plan, and this time of maximum unity is the best time for us to move on to the decisive battles.

Question: What do you think of the permanence and mobility of the guerrilla movement in Morazan within the FMLN's war plans?

Answer: I think that this is one of the best results of the work done over all these years, and it couldn't have been done without all this support from the people.

I remember, about 10 years ago, when it seemed impossible to us to speak of regular strategic units in our territory, which was so small and so intersected by roads and highways, that the enemy could easily move around.

Because of this situation, our first military units were created in the cities and they supplied the resources and bases of support so that the social bases could be developed among the peasants, which later were transformed, as the enemy kept on intensifying the repression, into regular strategic units.

These units kept on gaining points where the topography favored us for self-defense and for the formation of this powerful people's army, which is today the pledge of our victory.

And now this people's army, these strategic units have an unflagging morale, and are determined to move to the offensive and to win a total victory over the enemy.

Question: How would you describe the Salvadoran army? Are there any possibilities that it may split with part of it joining with the FDR project?

Answer: For many years the national army has been an instrument of the dictatorship, but also during all that time, with differences in quality and in different phases, patriotic, nationalist, and progressive currents and trends have appeared, which have sought democratic solutions for the situations facing the nation.

The fact that this army is composed of a peasant social base, recruited every year, makes it a nonprofessional force, unlike Somoza's army.

We are fully confident that there are honest men, there are people who understand the struggle of our people, inside the armed forces.

It would appear that all the military support the dictatorship, but we are certain that that is not true; and there is evidence that can not be concealed, such as the forced resignation of Col Adolfo Majano from the Christian Democratic military junta.

This is an obviously contradictory situation which is also expressed in the reactionary trend within the army headed by the top command of the armed forces, which also heads the paramilitary gangs, and which is also found in many low-ranking military men whose minds have been corrupted, and who have seen the army as a source of privileges and easy living.

This entire situation has converted them into unconditional supporters of the cause of the oligarchy and of imperialism, and it is precisely against this force that we are fighting.

We have nothing against the patriotic military, and we fully expect that at the moment of the decisive battles they will be on the side of the people, and that along with them, we will form the new armed forces of the people, the new army.

Question: What were the most recent military actions conducted by the guerrilla forces in Morazan?

Answer: To sum up and be brief, I will tell you about the latest armed task which occurred on 26 December when a number of our units,

which were perfectly armed and organized, took Osicala and destroyed the army that was trying to reach that city, the second largest city of the department of Morazan.

At the time when the city was taken, two ambush parties were placed along the access road to the main nearby garrisons, in Perquin and in San Francisco Gotera.

When the enemy moved his units from Gotera, they fell in the ambush. We managed to inflict a great number of losses, including both dead and wounded. The combat between the forces in Osicala lasted for about 3 hours. We had two casualties.

Question: What is the significance for the Salvadoran people of the fact that the other peoples of the world are following so closely the course of their fight against the Christian Democratic military junta?

Answer: I think this is important now when the danger of imperialist intervention is hovering over our country; for this is the only thing that could make our victory more difficult.

It is obvious that we need the support and solidarity of all the democratic and progressive peoples and governments of the world. We know that we are not alone in the struggle, and we hope to continue to have their support, because we have a viable political plan that will provide a just solution for all the groups that make up the democratic and revolutionary forces of our country.

This political proposal expresses the desires and the longing for peace in the region, for Central America, Latin America, and for the democratic forces of the rest of the world.

7679

CSO: 3010

FDR'S PICHINTE URGES PEOPLE'S UNITY FOR FINAL OFFENSIVE

Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 5 Jan 81 p 2

[Report on interview with Leoncio Pichinte, member of the Executive Committee of the FDR, on 1 January 1981 in El Salvador]

[Text] Special report from San Salvador -- Leoncio Pichinte, a member of the Executive Committee of the FDR [Democratic Revolutionary Front] and secretary general of the 28 February Popular Leagues, in speaking with a correspondent from COMIN [expansion unknown], made some important statements on the work that this coalition of popular and democratic organizations is doing.

These statements were made on 1 January, somewhere in El Salvador, to the COMIN correspondent. Pichinte said: "At this time the fundamental task of the Salvadoran people is to prepare and organize for the participation of the masses in the decisive battles which will soon be fought."

The leader said that one of the most important tasks accomplished has been the preparation of the structures of the Salvadoran mass fronts so that they will be prepared to guide the popular uprising. This is an essential element within the guidelines prepared by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, which a few days ago announced its decision to begin preparations for the final offensive, with which it hopes to defeat the Christian Democratic military government now in power in El Salvador.

"Our mass movement is working with a strong combat spirit and with great decisiveness. There has been great discipline in the work preparing for the general political strike, which is one of our responsibilities within the plan presented by our FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] vanguard," said Pichinte.

Expansion of the Democratic Forces

Asked about the position taken by the FDR on the rest of the forces that are not taking part in this opposition political coalition, the leader said: "The appeal that the FMLN issued a few days ago to the sectors that are still not part of the FDR was a highly positive factor. We believe that, when confronted with the present situation of collapse and total disintegration of the Christian Democratic military government, the proposal of the democratic revolutionary government, for which we in the FMLN and the FDR are fighting together, has become a more realistic alternative for those sectors that have not taken a definite position and which, while they haven't supported the genocidal Salvadoran junta, have not chosen to join with the FDR. At this time we believe that in order to take part in the process, it is not absolutely essential to join forces organically with the FDR, but rather that we must seek agreement on the political proposal that we have presented to the Salvadoran people and to the international community, as the only real way to resolve the serious and troubling crisis of our nation: that is, the installation of the democratic revolutionary government, in which all sectors which have worked in the struggle to defeat the present dictatorship will take part."

The leader further said that he was one of those who miraculously escaped from the massacre of the FDR leaders.

In closing, Pichinte said: "The Salvadoran people have immense confidence in their victory. What is so impressive is their joy in preparing for war, and in facing such an immense job--the organization of the people for the final battles for their liberation; only the high political and ideological level attained by the masses throughout the lengthy years of their heroic and bloody struggle against their oppressors has made it possible, by means of a broad-based mass organization, for our vanguard, the FMLN, to be now moving into position for the great battles for the final liberation of our people."

7679
CSO: 3010

ARCHBISHOPRIC LEGAL AID SERVICE CONDEMNS JUNTA'S NEW STRUCTURE

Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 26 Dec 80 p 2

[Statement released by the Archbishopric's Legal Aid Service in San Salvador on 15 December 1980]

[Text] The Legal Aid Service of the Archbishopric of San Salvador has issued a very important statement addressed to all peoples of the world, condemning the imposition of Napoleon Duarte and Jaime Abdul Gutierrez as the "rulers" of El Salvador; these men now threaten to carry to extreme lengths the policy of genocide against the people, and the plans of U.S. imperialism. While the document is a strong attack and an appeal for solidarity with the struggle of the Salvadoran people, it also exposes all the maneuvers that imperialism, Christian Democracy, and the Salvadoran oligarchy have used since 15 October 1979 to sell to the world the idea that in El Salvador there is a clash between the "extreme right and the extreme left, which are both opposed to the reformist plans of a centrist junta."

Since 22 October 1979 Legal Aid, along with Monsignor Romero, has said that if the people supported the junta, the Church would have the duty to do so as well. But the 370 people who have been assassinated, the 312 people who have "disappeared," and the resignation in December 1979 of all the civilians from the junta have demonstrated that this is an antipopular government.

Again on 20 March 1980 Legal Aid joined with other groups in denouncing the repression against the people and the imperialist plan of repression with reforms, which was supported by Christian Democracy allied with the reactionary military.

Legal Aid also condemned the assassination of Monsignor Romero and more recently of the leaders of the FDR [Democratic Revolutionary Front] and of the North American nuns. It holds the junta of Duarte and Gutierrez responsible for the latter crimes.

Finally, Legal Aid has denounced the "peace treaty" between El Salvador and Honduras as a maneuver to increase repression against the people. "In this context," says the Legal Aid Service, "the decimated Christian Democratic Party, with Duarteist 'strong man' features, which is doing nothing other than staining with blood the international principles of Christian Socialism, and an army recognized throughout the entire world for its criminal deeds, an army even worse than the Somozist guard, have decided to impose in power two people, by means of repression. This imposition of Napoleon Duarte and Jaime Abdul Gutierrez is an attempt to deepen the repressive policy, as the final recourse of a dictatorship that is desperate because of the imminent triumph of the Salvadoran people."

This is the background of this statement, which we will now print below.

The Legal Aid Service of the Archbishopric has the moral obligation to state:

That on an international level, after the United Nations resolution condemning the "grave violations of human rights," it has been revealed that the Salvadoran conflict was never caused by an alleged war "between political extremes." This is believed only by the intelligence sources of the U.S. State Department. It was the immediate result of the war waged against the people by the Salvadoran military dictatorship, their national and international allies, and accompanied by the eight members who are left from an antipopular party with "one man rule" features.

There Is No New Government

With the imposition of Napoleon Duarte and Abdul Gutierrez as the president and vice president of the republic, there is no new government.

The military structures still remain intact and with the removal of Col Adolfo Majano and of the progressive military leaders, the repression against the Salvadoran people and Church will tend to reach unimaginable limits. Those people who have until now been guiding this repressive policy now hold all power.

With this system of a "military junta," the possibilities for a dialogue were reduced to a minimum; it now seems incredible to us that they are calling for a dialogue with the opposition, when the obstacles preventing such a dialogue have not been removed.

a. The case of people arrested for political reasons who later "disappeared" because of the regime has not been cleared up. Furthermore, during this year the figure of 213 people who disappeared over a 14-year period during the regimes of Sanchez, Molina, and Romero has doubled. Since 1 January, 380 people have been arrested and have disappeared because of the junta.

b. The military responsible for the repression (assassination, disappearances, tortures, military invasions of places of asylum and hospitals, with no respect for their neutrality) have not been tried. And some military held responsible for the assassination of Msgr Oscar Romero have been released (the case of Maj Robert D'Aubuisson). Others hold positions and are advisors of the military junta. We recall the prophetic words of Msgr Romero when he publicly called for Col Jose Guillermo Garcia to resign from his position because of his responsibility for repressive actions.

c. All the acts of persecution against the Church have not been investigated. Six priests and four nuns have been assassinated. The armed forces has been responsible for most of these deeds; military from other nations have also intervened.

Duarte and Gutierrez Do Not Represent Anyone

The present regime, headed by Napoleon Duarte and Abdul Gutierrez, does not represent any sector of the Salvadoran people. When Duarte claims that he reached the presidency through "the mandate of the army and his party," he is admitting that he has no social base of popular support. He is willing to be kept in power only by force, since what he calls "his party" consists of only eight people: Napoleon Duarte, Antonio Morales Erlich, Fidel Chavez Mena, Ovidio Hernandez, Adolfo Rey Prendes, Julio Samayoa, David Trejos, and Roberto Viera.

The first of our fundamental rights is the right to life. When this right is endangered, when it is being massively trampled on, the injured party is entitled to the supreme recourse of legitimate self-defense. In this case the Salvadoran people, who have been savagely brutalized during this year, as the United Nations has officially recognized, have the right to fully exercise their right of legitimate self-defense.

The Church, in the "very exceptional case of obvious and prolonged tyranny that may seriously damage the fundamental rights of human beings, and may endanger the wellbeing of the country," recognizes the legitimacy of an insurrection as the supreme recourse of popular self-defense.

Appeal to Christian Democratic Organizations of the World

The Legal Aid Service of the Archbishopric considers it appropriate to appeal to all Christian Democratic organizations of Europe and Latin America. The eight persons who now make up Christian Democracy in El Salvador have discredited themselves by tolerating terror and lies. And by acting in the name of Christian Democracy, they are defaming and spattering with blood the principles of Christian Socialism. This attitude can only be explained by a blind hatred for the majority opposition or by an unbridled lust for power.

History, sooner rather than later, will judge this group of Christian Democrats and those Latin American governments which have supported them by having cloaked in political respectability the worst massacre, the most cruel repression, the latest genocide in the contemporary history of the continent. These eight people, famous because of their complicity with terror, have no influence at all on the government, but they shield those who are staining the Salvadoran soil with blood.

The Legal Aid Service of the Archbishopric of San Salvador is appealing to the Christian Democratic institutions of Europe and Latin America so that they will not let themselves be convinced by the residue of a party that is alienated from the Salvadoran people and a friend of its torturers. This residue gives political backing to the military responsible for the systematic slaughter of the Salvadoran people.

For all the thousands of Christians who have fallen assassinated in El Salvador we ask that your institutions not recognize and not give any support to the present system of government in El Salvador.

Appeal to the Governments of the World

We urge the governments to respect the United Nations resolution not to supply arms or any type of military aid to the Salvadoran government.

We ask the Christian people of the United States to keep your government from sending any type of aid, either military or economic, to those who have until now been the proteges of your government.

Appeal to Christians and Men of Good Will Throughout the World

Finally, the Legal Aid Service of the Archbishopric asks Christians and people of good will throughout the entire world to join

together in solidarity with the just goal of the poor people of El Salvador.

The society that generates injustice and sin must be torn out by its roots and the homicidal hatred which is trying to perpetuate these evils must be opposed. When the hour of triumph comes, we will understand that the blood of so many Christians has been the seed of freedom. We will be able to say with our beloved Msgr Oscar Amulfo Romero: "I want to remain on the land, along with the people, fighting with them for liberation. I cannot relax and I do not want to rest so long as there are men to be freed."

7679

CSO: 3010

BRIEFS

PACT WITH CANADA--Georgetown, Dec. 23 (CANA): Guyana and Canada have signed an agreement designed to attract private Canadian investors here through reducing fears of nationalisation of their assets, diplomatic sources reported today. The agreement, similar to others drawn up between Canada and Third World countries, aims at curbing fears among Canadian private investors of nationalisation of their ventures by host governments, according to a spokesman for the Canadian High Commission here. It was signed in Georgetown last Thursday. Pointing out that there was a "real fear of nationalisation and a host of things leading up to or including expropriation" among Canadian and other foreign private investors, the spokesman explained that the agreement was "a token of understanding and cooperation and facilitates negotiations if there is ever a problem." He added that the accord offered the private companies insurance from the Canadian government of their investments and in the event of nationalisation, the issue would then become a matter for discussions between the Canadian and Guyana governments and would save the companies the bugbears of long-drawn-out legal procedures for compensation. [Text] [Kingston THE DAILY GLEANER in English 24 Dec 80 p 16]

CSO: 3025

AMBASSADOR TO HAITI NAMED

Mexico City EL DIA in English 16 Jan 81 - 9

[Photo caption]

The Mexican Foreign Ministry has reported that President Jose Lopez-Portillo has appointed as Mexican ambassador to Haiti Mr. Hector Perez Gallardo. A career diplomat, he enrolled in the foreign service in 1957. He has served in various ranks in the Mexican consulates in El Paso, Milan and Antwerp; and also in the Mexican embassies in France, Portugal, West Germany, the USSR, the GDR, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands; and as ambassador to El Salvador from 1979 to 1980.

CSO: 3010



ALL CITIZENS URGED TO UPHOLD 1981 THEME OF DEFENSE PRODUCTION

Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 4 Jan 81 p 3

[Editorial]

[Text] Defense and production are the watchwords of the people of Sandino. The completion of both tasks will influence the consolidation of revolutionary power and self-determination, on the one hand, and future economic development and national well-being, on the other hand. Neither task can be carried out separately, and both entail a series of responsibilities whose fulfillment demands a revolutionary spirit of sacrifice and selflessness on the part of the Sandinist people.

The noisy demonstrations of the imperialist warmongers and the aggravation of the crisis in the system of domination, especially in Central America, have objectively led to an international situation in which the warmongers are fighting to fulfill their aggressive and interventionist designs.

It seems obvious that the strategy of imperialism is not just to squelch the emerging forces of one or another country in crisis, such as El Salvador or Guatemala. There are indications that an integral part of that strategy is a confrontation with the forces that have conquered political power, as in the case of the Sandinist Revolution. It is only logical that in the countries located in the area where the power problem has been resolved in favor of the Revolution, and the construction of a new life has begun, this confrontation is an inevitable result of the crisis, and furthermore a concrete factor in the escalation of that crisis to a higher level.

At the same time, internal sectors which are supporting the restoration of imperialist, reactionary domination in our country, are desperately trying to divide the social bloc of the Sandinist forces, consisting of the majority of those involved, and are selling a false image of the revolution abroad in order to break up our bloc of internationalist alliances and thereby facilitate direct imperialist intervention in Central America. Everything indicates that it is the worsening of the crisis as a result of the action of the people, along with a favorable international situation, that could lead to direct aggression by the imperialists and their allies.

This situation, the inevitable result of the crisis in the system and its revolutionary transformation, means that we who have won our political liberty

cannot devote ourselves exclusively to the peaceful construction of our historic destiny.

We are forced to prepare ourselves to defend the freedom we have won, at the same time that we carry out the social transformations that will allow us to improve our people's standard of living. This defense requires the cooperation of all the people. It is no longer a question of facing an enemy such as the Somoza dictatorship, but of facing a powerful international enemy. This requires high levels of organization and ideological, political and combative preparation of the great masses. The development of the Sandinist Peoples Militias and the Reserve Battalions, along with the EPS [Sandinist People's Army] and the forces of the Interior Ministry, as well as the establishment of the mass organizations for civil defense, are the tasks that will implement the Defensive Line of Action in the political, ideological and military spheres.

No less important is the neutralization and political and ideological defeat of our internal enemies, which would strengthen the unity of the entire nation. The domestic front is of vital importance in protecting the freedom and power that we have won.

In addition, the economic tasks that will in the future determine the improvement of our people's material and spiritual life, while freeing us of our economic dependence on imperialism, are part of the material basis of our political independence, and require a strong effort by the entire nation to raise levels of material production. There can be no national economic development if we are unable to exercise political freedom, or if we render it a tool of wastefulness and laxity in production.

The effort to raise production levels should be linked to the task of raising productivity; that is, every worker and productive unit should produce more in less time and with less expenditure of human and material resources, with no sacrifice of quality. The Reactivation experience of 1980 proves that our hard-working people are capable of implementing a series of organizational measures in production in order to produce more in less time. The result is savings in productive resources in the production of each article or service. It is possible not only to maintain quality, but to improve it. As our own experience has shown, within certain limits, it is possible to reach this goal without new and costly technological investments. It is still possible to rationalize the utilization of machinery and technology, as well as manhours.

The problem of production is not just a matter that should be dealt with as a function of the objectives of improving our people's life, or only to free ourselves of economic dependence and spur the country's development; it is also a function of the defense of the Revolution. We cannot defend our national independence and revolutionary power without a material foundation that provides for the financing of defense or ensures material resources for a nation at arms which must face its enemies.

We conclude by pointing out that the slogan for 1981, "1981: Year of Defense and Production," like any truly revolutionary theme, synthesizes the immediate future of the Revolution; it represents the sum of the high-priority and indispensable tasks that confront the Sandinist Revolution. In the face of these tasks, each worker, each student, each professional, technician and businessman must patriotically assume his historic responsibility. This is a constant responsibility that will be present during every hour, every day of 1981.

CSN DISCUSSES IMPORTANCE OF ACHIEVING WORKING CLASS UNITY

Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 5 Jan 81 pp 6, 7

[NUEVA ECONOMIA supplement; roundtable discussion with Labor Union Coordinating Office of Nicaragua (CSN); passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] NUEVA ECONOMIA presents its readers in general--workers in particular--with the results of the roundtable discussion held with the Labor Union Coordinating Office of Nicaragua (CSN). This first roundtable provided an opportunity to cover two key aspects of the workers' movement: labor unity, and participation.

Both topics were discussed with an acute critical and self-critical attitude by the leaders who represent the various labor unions that are operating in the working class. Present were: Edgardo Garcia of the Agricultural Workers Association (ATC), Onofre Guevara of the Union of Nicaraguan Journalists (UPN), Ivan Garcia of the Sandinist Workers Federation (CST), Ricardo Guevara of the FO [Workers Front], Napoleon Loaisiga of ANDEN [National Association of Nicaraguan Educators], Alejandro Solorzano of the General Labor Confederation (CTG-i), and Allan Zambrana of CAUS [Center for Labor Unity and Action]. Basically the various unions they represent have similar positions on the topics discussed.

The spirit of unity of the workers prevailed over private interests. The mature attitude of the discussants allowed them to cover the material that will serve as a basis for future discussions that will accompany the political actions of the workers in their efforts to forge a New Nicaragua.

[Question] We would like for the Labor Union Coordinating Office to make a brief outline of the problems of Labor Unity.

[Answer] It is true, there is a series of political, organizational and labor action problems.

The Coordinating Office is not the only force in the Revolutionary Process; there are labor organizations that support another project which does not represent the workers' fundamental interests. These organizations are trying to undermine the foundations of the revolutionary organizations, and the result has been the clash which has impeded the process of Labor Unity.

This first phase that we have covered has been the first step toward unity.

We feel that at this point we have already covered that phase, and we should hasten to reorganize ourselves, developing a Labor Unity project that involves the workers in the control of production and distribution, while also strengthening political efforts. That is, it should be a project that encourages and strengthens worker participation in political and economic activities.

These are very important elements; we are speaking of the interests of the workers, not just in immediate terms, but also in strategic terms.

One of the principles that should govern the labor-related efforts of the Coordinating Office is the reinforcement of the vital points on which there is broad agreement.

We would also like to point out that this Unity has a marked classist nature. When we speak of a classist nature we are not talking about theoretical or ideological aspects; we are saying that it should be a unity not only on the level of the executive bodies of the various unions, but it should also promote a wide-ranging discussion among the rank and file workers. If we discuss and make a series of plans, the goal must be that the workers discuss and participate in the plan of action that results.

We must recognize that a sector of our working class is still not sure of what is happening. This sector does not completely understand the project. The organizational effort is still deficient; we must make a greater effort. We could say that there is an imbalance between organizational development and the growth of the leading cadres; they are not developing at the same pace as the movement itself.

Objective Limitations and Labor Union Action

We believe that the objective limitations such as wages, working conditions, training, participation and incentives, impede the organizational process and the political development of the workers.

When we have a strike situation in productive centers, we must say that the blame lies not just with workers or technicians. The truth is that we will encounter more problems, because we are involved in a historic task, the transformation of the old relations of production. That task entails serious limitations.

Along with the problems of our economic base, we find that the old positions and misunderstandings of administrative structures or the economistic spirit of some sectors, still persist in centers of production.

Organization of Agricultural Workers

Agricultural workers suffer from serious cultural limitations and poor living conditions. The economic base prevents agricultural workers from making a short-term organic response, perhaps faster than urban workers or their permanently employed fellow workers.

The seasonal worker, for example, the coffee cutter, has a single idea in his mind, a single mode of behavior: /capitalization/. He does not think of /participation/. That is, he goes to cut cotton or coffee to receive a wage that will tide him over during the time when he is unemployed or is working on his little plot of land and does not receive wages.

It is for that reason that organization is difficult for us in rural areas. We must deal with misconceptions about Agrarian Reform in union leadership, because some people assume it means just the distribution of land.

Thus, from the theoretical point of view, that entire work force is prevented from participating, organizing and progressing.

Positive experiences have been confined to those agricultural production centers where the workers have permanent jobs, where they can not only work with the machete, but also form ties with the workers of agroindustry.

That is why the problem of unity goes beyond the unification of three or four labor unions; it is a question of the /unity of the working class/, which even has problems arriving at a simple understanding or integration between a lowly job such as cutting with a machete, and a more sophisticated occupation.

We can then say that in rural areas, the class development of agricultural workers involves guaranteeing permanent employment and maintaining a steady politico-ideological effort.

Clarification Is Vital in CUS and CTN Rank and File

With respect to the labor organizations that oppose the workers' project, the correct course of action is to begin an ideological campaign of clarification among the rank and file workers of the Federation of Nicaraguan Workers (CTN) and the CUS [Confederation for Unity of Trade Unions]. The members of these two organizations should be able to interpret the validity of revolutionary positions and to question the negative attitude of their leaders, within the framework of Labor Union Democracy.

[Question] Has a plan of action been devised? How will those objectives be achieved?

[Answer] There is a plan of action. We have formed three commissions to draw up a project. We already have some idea of the problems that need to be resolved and their causes. But what we need to do is explain correctly the reality of the labor movement. This meeting between the Coordinating Office and the NUEVA ECONOMIA team is a giant step toward clarification, and will gradually overcome fears and false divisions.

Broad Process of Participation in Labor Movement

As we said earlier, we are going to begin this broad process of participation among the rank and file workers in order to discuss the plans that have resulted from the process of explaining our situation. The workers should help in the formulation of the objectives that we are proposing, to see if what we have

proposed really corresponds to their demands. We need to know if they are capable of following up on them and achieving higher levels of worker organization.

We will take up our objectives once again, and deal with them with the honesty manifested by each of the member unions of the Coordinating Office. We must bring these proposed objectives and the means to achieve them, to the rank and file workers; we must make them part of our organizations. Only in that way will we be able to bring about a true transformation and carry out our tasks with political maturity and organization.

The coordination of union activities through the Coordinating Office is of vital importance. We cannot continue with this chaos. The Assembly process that we are going to implement must take precedence over the autonomy of the individual unions.

We cannot pigeonhole ourselves and keep reflection or discussion on the executive level. If we compartmentalize ourselves and do not bring everything to the rank and file members, we are fooling ourselves. The worker, no matter how productive he is, will always be affiliated with the union merely through his membership card if he does not have an awareness of the philosophy and objectives of the organization. We must go to the rank and file; if not, we will be unable to support our activities as leaders.

We must point out that when we go to the rank and file members we must have a project, a plan to discuss. Such a plan can be a mobilizing factor that will arouse the workers' interest. If we have nothing but general "schemes" we cannot overcome this "union paralysis." We must tell the workers: For this project we need to work harder! For this project we must organize our defense!

Membership Card No Guarantee of Participation

We must make some comments on the participation of organized workers in their own organizations. We must say that it is not enough to have a labor organization, to have all the workers signed up as members; we must make them participate as workers, as union members; they must be aware that they have an obligation to their organization. This means that every organized worker must assume responsibility for organizing his section, department or shop. In every area, whether it be a large or small business, organization must be encouraged. Only organization can make that class consciousness possible; otherwise it is impossible.

[Question] How can a job, an organization, a political position be maintained in the presence of the objective limitations that exist in every business or neighborhood? If material stimuli cannot be provided because of these limitations, what are we to do?

[Answer] That is precisely what should be the backbone of the project to be formulated: We must realize that there are serious limitations in wages, working conditions, training and social benefits. These limitations can only be overcome through the revolutionary means that are necessary at each moment. The conscience of the working class cannot be suborned, as the bourgeoisie is trying to do through bourgeois union movements. The workers are trying to organize; they are producing within their political project; they are progressing in their project;

they are making the necessary efforts to achieve the political and organizational progress needed for this period.

That is the way it happened in the war. The limitations were overcome when the people had a clear idea of the objective. They accepted the costs, not only by going hungry, not only by breaking their backs; they gave their lives, their blood. And not just one person, but thousands. Because they had a clear idea of the goal, they knew what the objective was. In this case, the project is much more difficult and complex, obviously, because more participation is required, and it is a longer project with more loopholes. The imperialists are offering alternatives of millions of dollars; the bourgeois unions are trying to say that there are other alternatives in changing the government, etc. No one is offering economic alternatives, except for profit sharing, which the workers know is ephemeral. However, the fundamental idea is to assume that this is a political task.

[Question] How is participation envisioned in terms of the Economic Program and its goals?

[Answer] Those who have worked in this society in the past have made up the force of the workers. What we must do today is encourage the working people to discover the economic and social reality of the country. They need to learn the general features of Program 81, but more importantly, they must have a thorough knowledge of the goals and responsibilities of their company and their productive sector. Depending on the mechanisms set up in each business, each union will have its responsibilities.

They must know which programs within the general plan are designed for their center of production.

If they work in a textile plant, they must discuss the goals and responsibilities of that sector, particularly those of their own company. Within the company there should also be a discussion of how much each section should produce. In this manner, the work emulation programs should be established.

This process is not happening, but it should be encouraged. It is not enough to discuss production goals; there must also be a discussion of the organization of work, and how working conditions can be changed within existing limitations.

Just talking about matters related to the Production Goals in a cold, calculating way can lead to /productivism/.

We are almost certain that one of the aspects related to the APP [Area of People's Property] enterprises that will be discussed and will present problems, is the matter of /surpluses/.

"If there is greater productivity, there must be surpluses," say the workers. In this regard, we must point out and emphasize that surpluses cannot be used to meet the needs of just one company. We must think of the needs of the entire nation.

The problems of Nicaragua are not strictly economic or political. The workers will talk about the fundamental aspects of the Revolution and will think about them in terms of the strategic interests of the workers and the population in general.

OPPOSITION LEADER PANDAY RETURNED, OUTLINES ULF POLICY

Port-of-Spain TRINIDAD GUARDIAN in English 5 Jan 81 p 1

[Text] Opposition leader Basdeo Panday was given a standing ovation yesterday after he was returned unopposed as Political Leader of the United Labour Front (ULF).

Accepting the leadership from which he had tendered his resignation last year, Mr. Panday said he was doing so "with humility but with determination to move closer to the party's goals."

Elections to the top positions in the party were held yesterday during the special congress at the Rienzi Complex in Couva.

Mr. Panday was one of three officers returned unopposed. The others were Mr. Nizam Mohammed, the chairman who won when the other candidate nominated--Senator Kusha Haraksingh--declined; and Mr. Kelvin Ramnath, the General Secretary who was the only person nominated for the position.

Mr. Panday told the congress that when he resigned as party leader in April last year he did not do so out of a pique, frustration or bitterness, but he did so out of a sense of duty.

He said there was a difference between the duty to struggle and the right to lead.

The right to lead one's fellows must of necessity depend on the wishes of the followers, he said.

The Opposition Leader pointed out that when he resigned as Party Leader he did not do so in a way to break up the party and he agreed to continue as Opposition Leader while the party made arrangements for elections.

Bright Signs

Mr. Panday said, too, that the question of leadership had plagued this country far too long and that some leaders were prepared to destroy their fellow men in their lust for office.

Mr. Panday said that looming on the horizon were the brightest signs of victory since 1956 and he declared 1981 the year of victory for the ULF.

He thanked the membership for the confidence they had demonstrated in returning him to "this burdensome office."

When Mr. Panday tendered his resignation after the defeat of the ULF in the Local Government elections last April, Mr. Panday said he regarded the result of the poll as a lack of confidence in his leadership.

He said the party had called on him to lead for another term and he was accepting with humility.

The congress continues next week Saturday at the same venue when Mr. Panday will give his official address as party leader and outline the ULF's plans for the year.

Four Papers

In elections for other top posts in the party, Senator Haraksingh was elected Vice-Chairman in a straight fight with Senator Nuevo Diaz.

Mr. Lennox Sankersingh was elected First Assistant Secretary and Dr. Emmanuel Hosien, Second Assistant Secretary.

The new Treasurer is Indra Rajbansee, former chairman of the St. Andrew-St. David County Council.

Yesterday's all day session included a report from the General Secretary, Rep. Kelvin Ramnath, on the state of the party, while Chairman Nizam Mohammed gave the Chairman's address.

Four papers were presented. They were "Crisis in Public Confidence" by Senator John Humphrey; "A Future for the Trinidad and Tobago Economy" by Mr. Winston Dookeran; "The Politics of People's Participation: by Dr. Brensley Samaroo; and "The World and Ourselves--A Foreign Policy for Trinidad and Tobago" by Senator Dr. Kusha Haraksingh.

CSO: 3025

EDITORIAL SCORES BISHOP'S 'TAWDRY SCENARIO' IN GRENADA

Port-of-Spain TRINIDAD GUARDIAN in English 8 Jan 81 p 8

[Text]

MR. MAURICE BISHOP, Prime Minister-by-coup of Grenada, has been complaining that there are moves afoot by the United States to invade his country, plans by some unnamed Caribbean countries to squeeze Grenada out of Caricom and by Britain and the US "to block Grenada's traditional sources of income."

It seems, however, that we have heard that song before. It's from an old familiar score.

And we know that it would serve no purpose to ask Mr. Bishop: Please don't play it anymore. Indeed, we find it all a terrible bore.

For Mr. Bishop has no choice now but to carry on with his tawdry dictatorial senario. To maintain the aura and impulse of his grimy little revolution, he must continue to play the beleaguered hero, threatened on all sides by the forces of evil, David surrounded by malevolent goliaths.

Comrades! Let us gird our loins, let us arm ourselves to repel the infidel invader, to turn back the imperialist hordes! Vive la revolution!

If the plight of the poor people of Grenada was not so grim, if their constitutional rights had not been so ruthlessly destroyed by the honourable leader, the whole episode could be readily dismissed as a lunatic attempt at comic opera.

But, however boring or ridiculous his antics, we know that Mr. Bishop

is in deadly earnest and that his People's Revolutionary Government, like the characters in an ancient Greek drama, must act out their ill-starred roles inexorably, scene by mounting scene, to the final and tragic denouement.

But where classic Greek characters are driven by relentless fate and circumstance, the PRG is propelled by the aggressive ideology of Marxism whose basic dynamic is nothing less than the conquest, mastery and domination of the universe.

In other words, Marxist-Communism is diametrically, unreservedly and violently opposed to the democratic way of life that we have chosen as our own. And while we in the West Indies could have remained fairly complacent as Castro did his subversive thing in South America and tilted at US windmills, we must now be on the alert for the contagion has invaded our backyard in the form of Mr. Bishop's revolutionary regime.

We must take the warning which Jamaican novelist John Hearne gave to his people before the General Elections which toppled the leftist Manley government last October. In his "Sunday Gleaner" column of October 5, Mr. Hearne wrote:

"If we choose the path laid out for us this Sunday afternoon by the PNP, we have set our feet firmly

along the path to Communism...and Communism is the harshest, most rigid aristocracy that has ever been imposed on men and women who are trying to find a way to live under a condition of equal opportunity."

The harsh and rigid aristocracy that Mr. Bishop has set up in Grenada must continue to deny the relevance of elections, thus effectively removing any chance that he may suffer at the hands of the Grenada electorate the same fate as Mr. Manley who was overwhelmingly dispossessed of power by the people of Jamaica.

Gone with the constitution of Grenada are also all the traditional freedoms by which a people can express themselves, can exercise their collective will - freedom of speech, freedom of the Press, freedom to oppose the Government in power, freedom of dissent....

As current history sadly demonstrates, the Marxists will stop at nothing to seize power and maintain dictatorial control. That is

what the horror of Afghanistan and the crisis in Poland are all about, the suppression of the people by a harsh and rigid aristocracy.

And these are all the lessons that we must learn.

If there are any plans by Caribbean countries to squeeze PRG-ruled Grenada out of Caricom, we would be the first to say, right on!

~~We have already alerted the region to the threat of Mr. Bishop's PRG, comparing it to a Trojan horse and we have called upon West Indian governments to make up their minds about their continuing "partnership" with the PRG.~~

We believe the time has come for a dialogue to this effect among West Indian leaders, possibly beginning with the big three of Williams, Seaga and Adams, all of whom, we are quite sure, are democrats at heart and must be deeply concerned with the future of Grenada and their relations with Mr. Bishop's illegal regime.

WIDESPREAD LABOR UNREST, STRIKES MARK PAST YEAR

Port-of-Spain TRINIDAD GUARDIAN in English 1 Jan 81 p 6

[Text]

THE END of 1980 was full of labour unrest throughout the country, and this was, perhaps, more evident in Central and South Trinidad, and up to Old Year's, more than 400 workers employed in the chemical industry in Central Trinidad were on the headline.

Recently, 300 oilworkers employed in the contracting industry in south east Trinidad (Guayaguayare) staged a 24-hour sit-out to protest alleged sub-standard wages and inferior working conditions.

They are employed with firms working for an offshore oil company.

Unrest is continuing in the oil industry, with workers at Trinidad and Tobago Oil Company (Trintoc) calling for an incentive bonus and improved pension plan.

And approximately 10,000 sugar workers want State-owned Caroni to settle their current wage negotiations.

One thing, their union — All Trinidad Sugar and General Workers' Trade Union — does not want industrial action of any kind.

AT STANDSTILL

This is a good sign, and, in fact, it appears that it is the intention of the union, to see that production is maintained, despite the struggle.

With respect to the problems and unrest at Federation Chemicals, where operations are at a standstill, the stand by the workers to take legal strike action at this time of the year, proved one thing: they are determined to undergo any sort of sacrifice.

Because when a settlement is reached, those who come after would also bene-

fit, so they are laying the foundation. Hence the struggle must go on, according to them.

Oilfields Workers' Trade Union, bargaining body, is solidly behind the workers.

Question is: why should there be so much labour unrest in the country in the various industries?

Can't labour and management get together and resolve their problems amicably, so that the workers and the country, as a whole, could benefit?

Look at what is happening with the soft drink industry, because of the Fedchem strike. Other industries will be affected soon, if something is not done to resolve the dispute.

It is good to see the Minister of Energy and Energy-Based Industries, Rep. Errol Mahabir holding talks with OWTU, and is expected to continue on Tuesday with both OWTU and Fedchem, together with the Minister of Labour, Senator Desmond Cartey.

When one looks back and considers what the late hero of labour and Trinity Cross holder, Mr. Tubal Uriah "Buz" Butler, said about the marriage between labour and management, it would seem that is the only way in which the labour problems could be minimised.

There must be a marriage between labour and management for the smooth and effective working of the various industries in this

country, but that dream by Butler is still not a reality.

Worker participation in decision-making of the various enterprises could well spell success, because the workers will be able to see the problems and assist in solving them.

One would think that if the workers were satisfied a particular industry was operating at a loss, they or their union would not even attempt to make heavy demands.

In fact, they would assist in making the industry viable, so that they, too, would gain.

As OWTU leader, Mr. Weekes, said to Mr. Andrew Rose, Chairman of Trintoc, recently:

"The substantial investment that Trintoc is contemplating is, we believe, further justification for the granting of an incentive bonus.

"The workers must participate fully in these developments. Their efforts will be crucial for the success of the project under study."

Successful expansion will never be completely realised if bad human and industrial relations exist at Trintoc.

HEARTENING NOTE

The union, therefore, believes that an incentive

payment will spur workers on to greater productivity, and help ensure success of the new projects.

There must be good industrial and human relationships between workers and management for the economic development of the country, as a whole, and in particular for the smooth running of the various enterprises.

Contractors and General Workers' Trade Union had its share of the problems with Lake Asphalt Company of Trinidad and Tobago (1978). Limited over payment of overtime.

It is heartening to note that this has been settled.

On the other hand, the union and Chief Personnel Officer (CPO) are locked in a dispute over classification of daily-paid workers of San Fernando Borough Council and unless this is settled expeditiously, we might see a dirty borough for the new year.

Point Lisas, the centre of industrial developments, is quiet. The Brotherhood union, which represents the majority of the 7,000 workers employed by contractors, has had its problems time and again, but according to one of its officers, things are very quiet at the moment.

It is hoped that 1981 will see fewer industrial disputes in all sectors of the economy.

LABOR STRIFE AT PORT CONTINUES; VESSELS DIVERTED

Port-of-Spain TRINIDAD GUARDIAN in English 31 Dec 80 p 4

[Text] The work stoppage on the waterfront took another turn yesterday. Port Managers ended their two day sickout to press demands for retroactive backpay but another group of workers embarked on a work-to-rule while a third group called for a general shutdown of the port.

The industrial row started a week ago, has closed down operations for five days at a time when businessmen and importers were praising the rapid handling of cargo on the docks.

Seventeen cargo ships laden with goods and raw materials from all over the world are anchored in port while another 13 are in the stream. Five vessels have skipped port and detoured to Barbados and Guyana, berthing officers said.

The 20 Port Managers who control the waterfront are demanding a 58 per cent increase in wages retroactive 1978.

Yesterday morning, a Port official said, that a meeting took place between managers, foremen, assistant shed managers and supervisors and it was unanimously agreed that Port Authority Chairman, Mr. Eustace Bernard should be recalled from vacation to defuse the crisis.

It was reported that nonmanagerial staff agreed to work-to-rule to protest the slow pace of handling their outstanding grievances while other waterfront workers called for a total shutdown of operations.

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